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ABSTRACT 
Even before the promulgation of The Securities Enforcement Remedies and 
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (SERPSRA), the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) was entitled to seek disgorgement.  
Since 1971, the courts have been explicating the remedy as applied in the SEC 
enforcement context, and much of the doctrinal development had taken place by the 
time SERPSRA was enacted.  However, the doctrine of disgorgement as applied in 
the SEC enforcement context is not entirely settled.  Increasingly, the defense bar is 
finding acquiescence by certain jurisdictions to offsetting disgorgement by a 
defendant’s costs and expenses.  Such costs have been deemed to fall within one of 
two categories: (1) direct or transactional costs and (2) general business expenses.  
Earlier in the same year SERPSRA was passed, a recondite case out of the Western 
District of New York held business expenses were legitimate offsets to 
disgorgement.  This was when the doctrinal development became deranged. 
This article seeks to explore the concept of equity embodied in the securities 
laws as intended by Congress.  Accordingly, this article asks whether Congress 
intended to codify the traditional common law notions of equity in disgorgement, or 
is the SEC’s disgorgement sui generis.  To answer this question, the philosophy 
behind disgorgement is exhaustively fleshed out through a historical case analysis.  
Next, the article establishes what the author believes to be a new concept, the theory 
of regulatory equity.  Following the establishment of this theory, the practice of 
offsetting disgorgement is analyzed to see whether it is faithful to this new concept 
of equity.  The article then considers examples of offsetting which have enjoyed the 
imprimatur of the Supreme Court of the United States and explains why the practice 
is illegitimate.  Finally, the article asks whether the grave need for meaningful and 
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effective fraud deterrence in the investment industry and the vast inconsistency in 
how disgorgement is applied in these contexts warrants certiorari by the Court. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the context of enforcement actions brought by the SEC, meaningful 
deterrence remains a desideratum.1  There are several powerful remedies available 
to the SEC to assist it in its congressionally ordained crusade for this holy grail of 
law enforcement.  Chiefly, the Commission almost entirely relies upon 
disgorgement.  Disgorgement is the act of giving up something, such as profits 
illegally obtained, on demand or by legal compulsion.2  “Disgorgement has become 
the routine remedy for a securities enforcement action.  If a person is found in 
violation and has profited from the ensuing transaction, courts generally order the 
disgorgement of those profits.”3 
Yet, there is a dearth of scholarship on disgorgement as sought by the SEC in 
its enforcement actions.  Notably, disgorgement was not expressly a part of the 
remedial scheme set forth by Congress until the last decade of the Twentieth 
Century.4  This absence largely explains the scarcity of scholarship.  But, beginning 
in 1971 with Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,5 the 
courts started the process of developing the doctrine of disgorgement in the SEC 
enforcement context.  While the theories of equity and restitution were well known 
at common law, it was unclear how they would be applied to disgorgement in 
securities fraud cases given the absence of such a remedy in the legislative 
framework.6  In fact, it was not even clear whether the law of restitution actually 
applied at all.7  At the time of Texas Gulf Sulphur, the elaborate statutory scheme 
                                                            
1 The Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which was the result of high stakes securities practices, such 
as boundless leveraging and sophisticated derivatives investing, leading to the massive market downturns 
2 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
3 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790 at 14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
4 See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 [hereinafter 
SERPSRA], Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (giving express authority for an accounting and 
disgorgement in the securities laws). 
5 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 1005 (1971) (first case granting disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action). 
6 It was not until October 15, 1990, that the term “disgorgement” appeared as remedial authority in 
the securities laws.  See SERPSRA, supra note 5. 
7 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993).  The court explicitly 
addressed the distinction between restitution and disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context: 
Despite some casual references in our [case law] to the contrary, . . . disgorgement is not precisely 
restitution.  Disgorgement wrests ill-gotten gains from the hands of a wrongdoer. . . . It is an equitable 
remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer from enriching himself by his wrongs.  Disgorgement does not 
aim to compensate the victims of the wrongful acts, as restitution does. . . . [Disgorgement] is not 
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Congress created for the regulation of securities did provide for an equitable 
remedy in the form of an injunction, and the court used this fact to conclude, where 
Congress granted one equitable remedy, it granted them all.8 
Later in 1971, the same year the Second Circuit handed down its decision, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Texas Gulf Sulphur.9  As a consequence, the 
doctrine of disgorgement enjoyed the imprimatur of the Court from 1971 until 
1990, when SERPSRA was passed.10  Today, the legitimacy of disgorgement in 
SEC enforcement actions is unchallenged. 
Ever since the Supreme Court denied review in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the lower 
courts have concentrated on two key doctrinal aspects of disgorgement: (1) 
developing the fundamental philosophy behind disgorgement and (2) determining 
how to calculate the amount to be disgorged.  While at first blush the latter concept 
seems rather straightforward, it has proved to be vexing and is where the greatest 
amount of intellectual discourse is needed.  Nevertheless, to understand how to 
calculate disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions, one must become intimately 
familiar with the purposes of, and the philosophy behind, disgorgement in the SEC 
enforcement context.11  
The central philosophical frustration with disgorgement is the choice courts 
must make between using the profit or proceeds theory of unjust enrichment.  Is the 
amount by which a wrongdoer was unjustly enriched limited to mere pecuniary 
accumulations?  Or, does enrichment capture those non-monetary benefits 
conferred to the defendant, which are nonetheless valuable?  In the former, a 
wrongdoer is allowed to perform a netting calculation—gross receipts less costs 
                                                            
restitution. 
Id. at 802 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
8 “[I]n other contexts[,] the Supreme Court has upheld the power of the [g]overnment without 
specific statutory authority to seek restitution, and has upheld the lower courts in granting restitution, as 
an ancillary remedy in the exercise of the courts’ general equity powers to afford complete relief.”  Tex. 
Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307.  See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (once a 
regulatory scheme set up by Congress invokes the equitable powers of the courts, it may bring to bear all 
such powers absent an express limitation); see also, L.A. Trust Deed Mortg. Exch. v. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, 285 F.2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960) [hereinafter LATDME] (“We conclude, therefore, as the 
Supreme Court has stated with respect to other regulatory statutes, that the Congress must be taken to 
have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory 
purposes.  As the Supreme Court long ago recognized, there is inherent in the courts of equity a 
jurisdiction to give effect to the policy of the legislature.”). 
9 See Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1301. 
10 See SERPSRA, supra note 5. 
11 It is important for the reader to notice the phrase, “SEC enforcement context.”  This qualifying 
phrase is meant to emphasize, in every instance, this article is attempting to discuss disgorgement when 
the SEC is bringing suit as a consequence of its regulatory enforcement authority.  Suits between private 
litigants arising out of a violation of the federal securities laws, and how disgorgement applies therein, is 
not being considered.  As will be demonstrated, this distinction will be integral in understanding how the 
SEC may use disgorgement to give effect to Congress’ intent when passing the securities laws.  See 
generally Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 104–07 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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incurred—to come up with the amount to be disgorged.12  In the latter, the same 
wrongdoer would not be afforded the benefit of his balance sheet and would be 
liable to disgorge the gross amount of funds flowing from the securities violation.  
It is at this nexus where the central thesis of this article lies.  What, if any, offsets to 
gross proceeds are legitimate?  
While the debate on what constitutes a legitimate offset spans as many topics 
as there are ways to violate the securities laws, the discussion can be reduced to 
offsets for costs or expenses incurred.  Courts have then categorized costs and 
expenses as either “direct transactional costs” or “general business expenses.”  As 
will be made clear, to some jurisdictions, the category in which a defendant’s 
request to offset falls is dispositive.  To others, the ancient equitable mores of the 
courts sanction ad hoc remedial relief.  And still, others, apoplectic over audacious 
securities violations, grant no offset for expenses and order gross funds received to 
be disgorged.13  Nevertheless, each victory by the Commission where disgorgement 
is offset by direct or general expenses approaches the point of being a pyrrhic 
victory.  Thus, the doctrine of disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context must 
be modified. 
As with all great questions of law, there is great disquietude spanning across 
the jurisdictions of the country, in some instances leaving defendants wishing they 
were in the Second or the Eleventh Circuits, while in others finding the SEC 
longing for the Sixth or Ninth Circuits.  The issue of “offsetting disgorgement” in 
the SEC enforcement context is especially frustrating because it calls upon the 
courts to employ their well understood ancient powers of equity, while not doing 
damage to the congressional intent underlying the securities laws.  This in of itself 
is an equitable task.  But, is there a new theory in equity which should be applied 
when the courts are adjudicating violations of elaborate federal regulatory schemes?  
When federal agencies bring suit in their law enforcement capacities, does the 
equitable relief they seek sound in this new theory of “regulatory equity?”  In short, 
if offsetting is permitted in a case at common law between private litigants, is 
offsetting necessarily just and faithful to congressional intent in SEC enforcement 
actions?  Finally, given the jurisdictional inconsistencies, should the SEC seek to 
use its resources to pursue cases on appeal, either to create conformity as a result or 
establish the circuit split which would capture the certification of the Supreme 
Court? 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OFFSETTING DISGORGEMENT 
Having teed-up the issue of disgorgement in the securities fraud context, the 
                                                            
12 HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23 (3d ed. 1992). 
13 It must be noted the lack of continuity could give rise to forum shopping concerns. 
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stage is set to discuss the offsetting issue.  Depending on the context, the concept of 
an offset is also referred to as a “setoff,” and more plainly as a mere reduction in 
some amount owed.  In the SEC enforcement context, the term “offsetting” seems 
to be most frequently used.  It describes the idea a defendant to an enforcement 
action may properly adduce evidence the Commission’s calculation of 
disgorgement is over-inclusive, and, as such, the defendant is entitled to “offset” the 
disgorgement order by certain costs or expenses.  Implicit in the practice of 
offsetting is the argument a defendant’s unjust enrichment is reduced by certain 
netting arrangements—overhead costs or brokerage fees.  This part of the article 
will address the current state of the law, while the remaining sections will reject 
offsetting through a new theory of regulatory equity and critique two cases which 
stand to threaten the deterrent framework intended by Congress. 
A. The Offsetting Debate 
Since 1971, essentially two lines of cases have emerged.  Not surprisingly, 
there is a line of cases denying offsets14 and another allowing them.15  Despite the 
overwhelming authority supporting the proposition offsetting is illegitimate, the 
pro-offsetting line of cases remains an inimical precedent.  In a case from the Sixth 
Circuit, a court recognized the bifurcation of the disgorgement doctrine, stating, 
“The [pro-offsetting] case law cited by the defendants is neither binding precedent, 
nor persuasive.  First the defendants’ cases are not precedent because none of them 
are from the Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court.  Conversely, [the SEC] has cited two 
Sixth Circuit cases regarding disgorgement.”16  Siding with the anti-offsetting line 
of cases, the district court ardently opposed giving any precedential or persuasive 
                                                            
14 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2004), cert. 
denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 
2004); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. TLC Invs. & Trade Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080 (D.N.J. 1996); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes 
Equities, 775 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. United Monetary Servs., Inc., 
1990 WL 91812 at 9 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1990); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 
1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Dimensional Entertainment 
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y.1980); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. 
Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
15 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 8, 2010); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790 at 15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010); 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Shah, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
16 Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. Supp. at 215 n.22 (rejecting Thomas James Assocs., 738 F. Supp. at 
88). 
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value to pro-offsetting cases from other circuits.17  The court further specified, 
absent a definitive ruling on the issue by the Supreme Court, it would continue to 
support the anti-offsetting line of cases.18  Thus, case-by-case, the offsetting issue 
seems to be ripening, setting the stage for an inevitable circuit split warranting 
certiorari. 
1. The Pro-Offsetting Line of Cases 
Many courts have held direct transactional costs, such as brokerage fees, 
commissions, or price premiums, are valid offsets.19  For example, courts in the 
Second Circuit have consistently held a court may, in its discretion, deduct from the 
disgorgement amount any direct transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions, 
which seem to reduce the wrongdoer’s actual profit.20  Still other jurisdictions have 
turned to the Second Circuit, presumptively expert in securities suits, to determine 
deductions for various transaction costs, including brokerage commissions paid to 
third party brokers as part of an agreement for services customarily rendered in 
connection with the transactions at issue, are proper offsets.21 
Additionally, price premiums paid for securities acquired as part of a 
defendant’s scheme to violate the securities laws have been accepted as proper 
offsets in the same way as brokerage fees.22  The argument is as follows: given the 
measurable nature of the premiums paid by the defendant and the court’s broad 
discretion in calculating disgorgement, the court will award disgorgement of net, 
not gross, profits, because they most accurately represent the amount by which the 
defendant was unjustly enriched.23 
Finally, with the exception of a few,24 the pro-offsetting line of cases have 
collectively compartmentalized disgorgement doctrine by erecting a partition, 
                                                            
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 See Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790 at 15; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Express, Inc., 646 
F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001); 
Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.1990). 
20 See Universal Express, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 564; McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4; Rosenfeld, 2001 
WL 118612 at 2; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Shah, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Litton Indus., 734 
F. Supp. at 1077. 
21 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 
2006); Litton Indus., 734 F. Supp. at 1077. 
22 See Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790 at 15. 
23 Id. 
24 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 8, 2010); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94–95 
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding general business expenses as valid offsets to disgorgement). 
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which distinguishes direct transactional costs from general business expenses,25 
presumptively allowing offsets in the former and usually not in the latter.  
Nevertheless, Thomas James Associates, as well as Video Without Boundaries, 
loom large as paradigmatic precedents for offsetting disgorgement by general 
business expenses.  “However, assuming this to be valid, it does not mean that a 
defendant can group his expenses under a broad category of business costs and 
accordingly expect deductions from the disgorgement amount without supporting 
evidence.”26  As a closing point, in the amount the Commission requests to be 
disgorged, the SEC can voluntarily deduct the cost of conducting the fraudulent 
scheme, but under the regulatory equity theory—explicated herein—this would not 
have to be done.27 
2. The Anti-Offsetting Line of Cases 
On the other hand, the overwhelming weight of authority holds securities law 
violators may not offset their disgorgement liability with business expenses.28  
Similarly, the SEC has tried the argument the overwhelming weight of authority 
supports no offsetting by direct transactional costs.  But, there the court rejected the 
argument as applied to brokerage fees.29  Nevertheless, the courts which have 
allowed an offset for direct transactional costs “have taken care to distinguish such 
costs from ‘general business expenses, such as overhead expenses, which should 
not reduce the disgorgement amount.’”30 
Initially, at the district court level, the D.C. Circuit passed on deciding 
whether general business expenses were valid offsets to a disgorgement order.  In 
                                                            
25 See McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4 n.6 (declaring brokerage fees should be distinguished from 
general business expenses, which should not offset disgorgement). 
26 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1133–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Thomas James Assocs., 
738 F. Supp. at 95.  And, more importantly, we are not assuming this to be valid. 
27 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1086–87 (D.N.J. 1996).  
Additionally, the SEC may, at its own discretion, decide the litigation risks associated with a particular 
suit warrant settling the case on disgorgement terms that take into consideration certain netting 
arrangements.  Thus, the Commission may use any calculation of disgorgement it likes in light of its 
expertise and experience, subject to the reasonableness standard explicated later in this article. 
28 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18), cert. 
denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 
1, 16 (D.D.C. 1998); Hughes Capital, 917 F. Supp. at 1087; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes 
Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214–15  n. 22 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. World 
Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984). 
29 See McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4 n.5. 
30 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Express, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4 n.6; Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 9, 2001). 
2014 DERANGED DISGORGEMENT 139 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bilzerian,31 the court observed: 
[The defendant] alternatively argues that he incurred expenses of 
$6,000,000 in his attempt to purchase [the target company] and that 
these expenses should be offset against his $6,540,770 in profits.  Even 
assuming this to be proper, defendant bears the burden of proving that 
these expenses were in fact incurred.  [The defendant] has merely 
asserted a bald figure and has made no attempt to substantiate it.32 
Note the court said, “Even assuming this to be proper,” which indicated the 
D.C. district court was not going to decide the offsetting issue in this case because 
there was not enough evidence to properly present it.  Importantly, the pronoun 
“this” in the block quote refers to offsetting.  The phrase can be rewritten as, “Even 
assuming [offsetting] to be proper, defendant bears the burden of proving that these 
expenses were in fact incurred.”  Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit had the opportunity 
to say whether offsetting was proper and declined to do so on the facts.  
In Kenton Capital, the D.C. district court finally had the opportunity to rule 
on the question it passed on five years earlier in Bilzerian.  Rejecting Thomas James 
Associates, the court held the “[defendants] may not escape disgorgement by 
asserting that expenses associated with this fraud were legitimate.”33  Thus, Kenton 
Capital stands for the proposition whether the expenses incurred while violating the 
securities laws were legitimate or otherwise is irrelevant.  A defendant is not 
allowed to offset disgorgement in the amount of general business expenses.  
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit adopted Kenton Capital in Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. JT Wallenbrock & Associates,34 reasoning, “Neither the deterrent 
purpose of disgorgement nor the goal of depriving a wrongdoer of unjust 
enrichment would be served were we to allow these defendants—who defrauded 
investors of $253.2 million—to escape disgorgement by asserting that expenses 
associated with this fraud were legitimate.”35 
“When addressing the amount of money that a defendant must disgorge, the 
Sixth Circuit has held, by implication, that the entire amount .†.†. which was 
illicitly received must be disgorged.”36  The court in Great Lakes Equity dropped a 
footnote explaining this reasoning: 
                                                            
31 814 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1993). 
32 Id. at 122 n.16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
33 69 F.Supp.2d 1, 15–17 (D.D.C. 1998). 
34 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). 
35 Id. at 1115 (citing Kenton Capital, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 17) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Mich. 1991); 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 1985), aff’g 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. 
Mich. 1983); cf. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Wash. Cnty. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir.1982) 
(stating the SEC is entitled to total disgorgement). 
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Blavin does not explicitly hold that no deductions may be taken for 
expenses; the issue of expenses is never directly addressed.  In Blavin, 
however, there is no deduction taken for expenses.  Moreover, it is clear 
that it is within the district courts’ equitable discretion to disallow 
expenses incurred in perpetration of the fraud even if there were Sixth 
Circuit authority for the proposition that expenses may be deducted 
from disgorgement.37 
Rounding off this line of cases, there is authority for denying offsets for 
overhead expenses and corporate income tax rates.38  In sum, the anti-offsetting 
cases argue the SEC is entitled to total disgorgement,39 and total disgorgement must 
mean a defendant is not entitled to offset the order by costs or expenses despite the 
category in which he or she falls.  
B. Other Arguments Supporting Offsetting 
While it is quite obvious by this point the central critique of the offsetting 
practice lies with certain costs and expenses incurred by the defendant, the defense 
bar has proffered several additional arguments which are worth settling before 
proceeding with the critique.  First, there is the somewhat controversial issue of 
subsequent use.  Then, there is the notion ability to pay and bankruptcy should 
mitigate against total disgorgement.  We will consider each in turn.  
1. Subsequent Use 
“Subsequent use” is a broad phrase intended to describe all the ways in which 
a wrongdoer may use his or her ill-gotten gains—investments purchases or 
donations.  The argument is the subsequent use of the defendants ill-gotten gain 
precludes him or her from satisfying the disgorgement order, and, thereby, the order 
works as a punishment.  This argument has failed resoundingly.  Several courts 
have previously noted “it is irrelevant for disgorgement purposes, how the 
defendant chose to dispose of [his or her] ill-gotten gains; subsequent investment of 
these funds, payments to charities, and/or payment to co-conspirators are not 
deductible from the gross profits subject to disgorgement.”40  “[A defendant’s] 
                                                            
37 Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. Supp. at 214 n.20; see also Blavin, 760 F.2d at 706. 
38 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(“[N]either do the circumstances warrant reducing this amount by [the defendant’s] overhead costs or by 
a hypothetical corporate income tax rate.”). 
39 See Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. Supp. at 214; Blavin, 760 F.2d at 706, aff’g 557 F. Supp. 1304; 
Wash. Cnty. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d at 227. 
40 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Express, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(citing Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 9, 2001)).; see also 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006); Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2008), cert. 
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assertion that portions of the misappropriated money was used for [legitimate 
corporate purposes], even if true, serves only to strengthen [the Commission’s] 
claim.”41  Thus, even capital investments in to legitimate business ventures are 
subject to disgorgement because they were the subsequent investment of the 
illegally obtained, or tainted, investor funds. 
What is more, the fact a defendant’s scheme ultimately fails and he or she 
loses a considerable amount of funds does not release him or her from disgorgement 
obligations.42  And, in determining how much should be disgorged in a case in 
which a defendant has manipulated securities so as to mulct the public, there is no 
reason why the court must give him or her credit for the fact he or she had not 
succeeded in avoiding losses.43  To waste or windfall, disgorgement deprives a 
wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains; and a person remains unjustly enriched by what was 
illegally received, whether or not he or she retains the proceeds of the wrongdoing. 
2. Ability to Pay 
The defense bar has also suggested the defendant’s ability to pay ought to 
warrant an offset of disgorgement.  The Second Circuit has said, “[T]o withhold the 
remedy of disgorgement or penalty simply because a swindler claims that he has 
already spent all the loot and cannot pay would not serve the purposes of the 
securities laws.”44  Consequently, the defendant’s inability to pay seems to be 
clearly irrelevant.  
However, not every court in the SEC enforcement context has dismissed 
ability to pay so readily.  In one instance, the defendant’s impecunious state caused 
by tax liabilities and the temporal decline in the stock market, in conjunction with 
having a mortgage and children ranging from nine to twenty-six, led the court to 
                                                            
denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 5 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 
(D.N.J. 1996); Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. Supp. at 214; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Benson, 657 F. 
Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (“The manner in which [the defendant] chose to spend his 
misappropriations is irrelevant as to his objection to disgorge.  Whether he chose to use this money to 
enhance his social standing through charitable contributions, to travel around the world, or to keep his 
co-conspirators happy is his own business.”). 
41 Benson, 657 F. Supp. at 1134. 
42 See JT Wallenbrock, 440 F.3d at 1117; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142. F.3d 
1186, 1192 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998).  Such factual scenarios are those in which the SEC may choose as a 
matter of litigation strategy to assert a modified disgorgement calculation, whether as a settlement offer 
or at trial.  Nevertheless, the Commission is fully entitled to the gross pecuniary gain calculation if it 
chooses to pursue it. 
43 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Common Wealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2nd Cir. 
1978).  But see Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684 (S.D. 
Fla. Dec. 8, 2010). 
44 See Universal Express, 646 F. Supp.2d at 565; see also United Energy Partners, 2004 WL 315185 
at 2, cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034; McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 5. 
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determine a disgorgement amount equal to a little more than a sixth of the 
defendant’s unjust enrichment would ensure the defendant did not gain from the 
violation.45  Correspondingly, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Huffman46 
has indirectly accepted ability to pay as a valid offset to disgorgement.47  There, the 
court said the evidentiary standard to be applied to a defendant’s ability to pay 
disgorgement was the usual civil preponderance of the evidence standard.48  By so 
holding, the court adopted the premise a defendant’s ability to pay should be 
considered when calculating disgorgement.  Especially illuminating was footnote 
four, in which the court more explicitly accepted ability to pay as an offset to 
disgorgement.49 
Nevertheless, the balance of authority weighs in favor of dismissing a 
defendant’s ability to pay as a valid offset.50  Furthermore, when given the 
opportunity to review a case on point, which supported the anti-offsetting line of 
cases, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.51  Hence, inability to pay is irrelevant.52  
Disgorgement deprives a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains; and a person remains 
unjustly enriched by what was illegally received, whether he or she retains the 
proceeds of the wrongdoing.53  Therefore, ability to pay is not a valid offset to a 
disgorgement order. 
                                                            
45 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
46 996 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1993). 
47 Id. at 803 n.4. 
48 Id. 
49 Footnote 4 reads: 
 
It does not disserve the SEC or other federal agencies to hold that a party 
bound by a consent order implicating public rights must satisfy the court of 
his inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence.  There is no statutory 
mandate for a higher burden of proof, and implying one from the language in 
[the cited case] verges on semantic gamesmanship.  [That case’s] careful 
description of the types of evidence [the defendant] should adduce to prove 
inability to pay is far more useful to the public than the vague, unusual call for 
plain and unmistakable proof. 
 
Id. 
50 See Universal Express, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 565; United Energy Partners, 2004 WL 315185 at 2, 
cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034; McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 5. 
51 See United Energy Partners, 2004 WL 315185 at 2, cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034. 
52 To the extent a defendant’s ability to pay is considered, the Commission should evaluate whether 
in such instances, disgorgement should be sought as relief, and if lesser relief would serve as an adequate 
proxy for deterrence.  In these scenarios, the SEC, as a matter of public relations, may feel ordering 
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, which has no hope of being complied with, looks like a waste of 
resources.  But, the validity of this strategy is not the object of this article.  Accordingly, this article 
reserves passing judgment on such strategies. 
53 Id. 
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3. Bankruptcy  
Bankruptcy follows ability to pay in this section because of how one may 
inferentially imply the other.  Additionally, the case law on bankruptcy has helped 
to conclusively solidify the proposition disgorgement is not restitution.  In so doing, 
the penultimate chess move has been made, setting the pieces in place for 
checkmating the practice of offsetting disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action 
by any category of business expense.  
Consider the following passage: 
We first address whether the Debt Act applies to disgorgement orders in 
the context of a securities violation.  The Debt Act is the exclusive 
means for the United States and its agencies to collect “debts.”  It 
permits an individual debtor to exempt from collection under the Act 
any property [which] is exempt from debt collection under the state law 
of the debtor’s domicile.  28 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(2)(A).  The Act expressly 
does not apply to collection of any monies owed which are not debts.  
28 U.S.C. § 3001(c).  The critical question is what the Act means by 
“debt.”  
The Act defines a “debt” as: 
(A) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a direct 
loan, or loan insured or guaranteed by the United States; or 
(B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a fee, 
duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, 
fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond 
forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United 
States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States[] but that is 
not owing under the terms of a contract originally entered into by only 
persons other than the United States.54 
“Although ‘disgorgement’ nowhere appears on this list, the defendants argue 
that disgorgement should be considered a form of ‘restitution’ or an ‘other source of 
indebtedness to the United States.’ .†.†. It is not restitution.”55 
Furthermore, “the statutory definition of ‘prejudgment remedy’ does not 
include disgorgement.”56  Lastly, consider Bilzerian: 
                                                            
54 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(A)–(B) (2012). 
55 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993).  However, there is this 
curious quote, the implications of which the article punts, to be addressed on a future date:  “The district 
court has broad discretion in fashioning the equitable remedy of a disgorgement order.  It may decide 
that some property should be exempt from such an order and may take state law as its guide.”  Id. 
56 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n  v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 735 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations 
omitted). 
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[The] defendant sought to enjoin the SEC from pursuing this 
disgorgement action on the grounds of the automatic stay provision of 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  The bankruptcy court rejected defendant’s 
argument, finding that the disgorgement action was excepted from the 
automatic stay as an exercise of the government’s police or regulatory 
powers.57 
In light of the implications regarding bankruptcy and indebtedness law, the 
courts have had to unequivocally state disgorgement is not restitution, and, by 
rejecting the invocation of ejusdem generis, so held disgorgement in the SEC 
enforcement context is sui generis.58  Consequently, ability to pay, bankruptcy, or 
indebtedness will not stand in the way of a disgorgement order in an SEC 
enforcement action. 
C. Legitimate Offsets 
Before going too far and denouncing offsetting wholesale, it is worth pausing 
to address the instances in which the disgorgement order may properly be reduced.  
Where remittances arise out of the same colorable transaction or occurrence, several 
jurisdictions have held settlement payments, restitution to private parties, payments 
in a previous criminal case, and deposits already in the registry of the court to be 
valid offsets to disgorgement.59 
Notably, Penn Central in 1976 adopted offsetting for disgorgement paid in a 
private litigation action but in the specific circumstance where the SEC enforcement 
action arose under the same colorable claim or securities law violation.60  By 
contrast, in Shah, the monies paid as a result of the private litigation action were 
pursuant to a different violation of the securities laws than those alleged in the 
Commission’s complaint, although arguably arising out of the same transaction or 
occurrence.61  Taken together, Penn Central and Shah tell us offsetting 
disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action by amounts paid in a private securities 
litigation action is only proper where the same colorable claim or securities law 
                                                            
57 Bilzerian v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 146 B.R. 871, 873 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992). 
58 See Huffman, 996 F.2d at 803 n.3. 
59 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 2004 WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 
18, 2008), cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034; Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 
863–64 (2nd Cir. 1998); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 
1998); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2nd Cir. 1996); Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. Shah, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Sec.  and Exch. Comm’n v. Penn Cent. Co., 
425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
60 See Penn Cent., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (offsetting disgorgement paid in the SEC 
enforcement action by an amount disgorged for the same complaint alleged in the private action). 
61 See Shah, 1993 WL 288285 at 4–5.  It follows, therefore, one defendant can create one scheme 
comprised of multiple securities violations and be liable for disgorgement in every suit brought pursuant 
thereto, as long as no part of the complaints overlap. 
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violation has been alleged.  Consequently, if a private securities litigation action 
stems from a material misrepresentation to investors but the Commission’s 
complaint alleges insider trading, then offsetting disgorgement in the Agency’s 
litigation by amounts given up in the private action seems to be beyond the 
discretion of the court. 
However, offsets in the amount of a defendant’s previous distributions related 
to the same violative transaction or occurrence do not extend to fines paid as a 
result of the associated criminal case.62  Furthermore, the balance of Penn Central 
and Shah notwithstanding, the gravity of the SEC’s objective of deterrence has been 
held so flattening previous payments of restitution as dramatic as one hundred 
forty-five million dollars can be denied as an offset to disgorgement in the 
commission’s civil action.63  Even when a defendant has already provided 
restitution to some defrauded investors pursuant to the settlement agreement with 
the Department of Justice, the district court can still require the defendant to 
disgorge all of his or her ill-gotten gains.64 
III. REGULATORY EQUITY AND ITS APPLICATION  
A. Introduction 
Before a detailed analysis of the calculation of disgorgement and the 
subsequent critique of offsetting can be performed, a distinction between 
“regulatory equity” and traditional common law equity and restitution must be 
made.  In this article, regulatory equity refers to the type of equity deemed by the 
Supreme Court to have been intended by Congress when passing the securities 
laws.  As the bifurcated line of disgorgement cases evinces, regulatory equity has 
been, and continues to be, an unrecognized area of the law.  This article seeks to 
contribute to its establishment and promotion. 
While, in many ways regulatory equity is similar to traditional common law 
equity, it allows for fashioning remedies, which do not match one-for-one the 
elements necessary in the common law between private litigants.  Consequently, 
disgorgement in the context of an SEC enforcement action has become a remedy 
which is sui generis.  The fundamental difference between common law equity and 
regulatory equity is in the composition of the parties involved.  Common law cases 
in equity are typically between an alleged wrongdoer and a complaining party who 
seeks the restoration of money or property after having a legally protected right 
                                                            
62 See Shah, 1993 WL 288285 at 4. 
63 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1113 at n.10 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
64 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Currency Trading Int’l, Inc., 2006 WL 988104 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 
2006) (emphasis added). 
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impinged.  In the context of an SEC enforcement action, the agency as the 
complaining party has no legally protected interests.  Rather, the agency acts not as 
a result of restorative impulses but as a necessary consequence of its law 
enforcement mandate.  
To darn together, for the first time, this tapestry I have chosen to call 
“regulatory equity,” we must first journey through swaths of cases which do not 
address disgorgement by the SEC directly.  These cases are the equitable 
antecedents to Texas Gulf Sulphur.  They are crucial to the development of 
regulatory equity because there the court was explicating the unique remedial 
scheme Congress intended the securities laws to embody, as well as the unique role 
the SEC has in enforcing them.  While later cases will weave the doctrine of 
disgorgement centrally into this theory, the initial cases represent the structural 
loom built by the federal courts prior to 1971. 
B. The Foundational Cases 
Regulatory equity broadly refers to the form Congress intended equity to take 
in the context of federal administrative enforcement.  Absent a mandate to codify 
the common law, the pursuit of regulating industries through regulatory regimes—
most replete with industry specific provisions and remedial frameworks—can be 
informed by the common law but should never be assumed equivalent.  
Accordingly, where Congress has incorporated a remedial framework into its 
regulatory regime, courts are compelled to give effect to that framework, common 
law principles notwithstanding.  Thus, the efficacy of the broad remedial scheme 
embodied in the securities laws depends upon the federal courts identifying the 
remedial intentions of Congress when it incorporated equitable relief into those 
statutes—whether Congress intended silence to be tacit acquiescence to the 
common law. 
The early cases in the regulatory equity line dealt with interpreting the scope 
of equitable relief absent express restrictions by Congress.  Before Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, the Supreme Court found it to be within the equitable jurisdiction of the 
Court to order disgorgement, pursuant to the law of restitution, where the federal 
statute in question was silent on such authority.65  There, the Court relied upon one 
of its earlier cases explicating a similar regulatory framework: 
[C]ourts must act primarily to effectuate the policy of the [Act] and to 
protect the public interest while giving necessary respect to the private 
interests involved.  The inherent equitable jurisdiction which is thus 
called into play clearly authorizes a court, in its discretion, to decree 
restitution of excessive charges that to give effect to the policy of 
                                                            
65 See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 
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Congress.66 
Going further, the Supreme Court explained, “it is not unreasonable for a 
court to conclude that such a restitution order is appropriate and necessary to 
enforce compliance with the Act and to give effect to its purposes.  Future 
compliance may be more definitely assured if one is compelled to restore one’s 
illegal gains.†.†. .”67  Accordingly, where a federal regulatory regime created by 
Congress invokes the equitable jurisdiction of the Court—”calls it into play”—the 
Court may fashion an equitable remedy to give effect to such regime, as long as the 
remedy itself is not expressly barred.68 
A few years later, the federal courts seized the opportunity to begin 
explicating the intended remedial scheme of the securities laws in LATDME: 
We conclude, therefore, as the Supreme Court has stated with respect to 
other regulatory statutes, that the Congress must be taken to have acted 
cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in 
the light of statutory purposes.  As the Supreme Court long ago 
recognized, there is inherent in the courts of equity a jurisdiction to give 
effect to the policy of the legislature.69 
Taken together, these precedents framed the issue of equity’s scope in the 
SEC enforcement context, and it would not be long before the highest court of the 
land got its chance to address the question, Is equity’s scope in a regulatory 
enforcement action the same as in a private right of action? 
Accordingly, in the 1963 case, Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau,70 the Supreme Court took to answering this 
question.  “We granted certiorari to consider the question of statutory construction 
because of its importance to the investing public and the financial community.”71  
The Court held the securities laws were, “designed to eliminate certain abuses in the 
securities industry, abuses which were found to have contributed to the stock 
market crash of 1929 and the depression of the 1930s.”72  “A fundamental purpose, 
common to [the securities laws], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure 
                                                            
66 Id. at 400 (citations omitted). 
67 Id. 
68 Furthermore, when the United States brings suit in its sovereign capacity, a statute of limitations 
does not ordinarily apply unless Congress has expressly provided otherwise.  Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998) (bringing to the fore an interesting aspect of federal 
enforcement and how it differs from private rights of action). 
69  L.A. Trust Deed Mortg. Exch. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 285 F.2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960). 
70 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
71 Id. at 184 (overturning the lower courts’ reading of the securities laws and finding the securities 
laws are not confined by traditional common-law concepts of fraud and deceit). 
72 Id. at 186–87. 
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for the philosophy of caveat emptor and[,] thus[,] to achieve a high standard of 
business ethics in the securities industry.”73  In this way, Congress intended the 
remedial scheme of the securities regulations to detract from unethical behavior, 
relying upon the courts to give effect to the deterrent purposes of the regime.  
Subsequently, the Supreme Court chose to characterize the new theory of 
regulatory equity as a species of common law equity, one newly adopted to the new 
ecosystem of the regulatory environment: 
It would defeat the manifest purpose of the [securities laws] for us to 
hold, therefore, that Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any 
practice which operates ‘as a fraud or deceit,’ intended to require proof 
of intent to injure and actual injury to clients.†.†. . This conclusion 
moreover, is not in derogation of the common law of fraud, as the 
[d]istrict [c]ourt and the majority of the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals suggested.  
To the contrary, it finds support in the process by which the courts have 
adapted the common law of fraud to the commercial transactions of our 
society.  It is true that at common law intent and injury have been 
deemed essential elements in a damage suit between parties to an arm’s-
length transaction.74 
[But, t]he content of common-law fraud has not remained static as the 
courts below seem to have assumed.  It has varied, for example, with 
the nature of the relief sought, the relationship between the parties, and 
the merchandise in issue.  It is not necessary in a suit for equitable or 
prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for 
monetary damages.75 
Thus, equity in SEC enforcement actions was never meant to reflect, point-
for-point, the common law of equity as it existed prior to the 1933 and 1934 Acts.76 
Furthermore, subsequent amendments to the original securities enactments do 
not necessarily substitute a narrower interpretation for the original, broader one.  
There is no indication in the 1990 Act Congress desired to supplant the doctrine of 
disgorgement as it had been developing since 1971.  “Moreover, the intent of 
Congress must be culled from the events surrounding the passage of the [original] 
legislation.  ‘[O]pinions attributed to a Congress [fifty-six] years after the event 
cannot be considered evidence of the intent of the Congress’” at the time of 
enacting the securities laws for the first time.77  
Since the largest body of securities violations is arguably based on fraud or 
                                                            
73 Id. 
74 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 192–93. 
75 Id. at 193. 
76 See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1933); Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1934). 
77 Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 199–200. 
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material misrepresentations, the Supreme Court went on to further distinguish 
equity in the SEC enforcement context from traditional common law equity.  
“Fraud has a broader meaning in equity (than at law) and intention to defraud or to 
misrepresent is not a necessary element.”78  “Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court 
of equity properly includes all acts, omissions[,] and concealments which involve a 
breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are 
injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken 
of another.”79 
There is even further evidence the Supreme Court was tailoring a new flavor 
of equity: 
There has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts that 
the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions 
involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the 
sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, and  that, accordingly, 
the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.80 
The Supreme Court then presented the smoking gun: 
We cannot assume that Congress, in enacting legislation to prevent 
fraudulent practices by [members of the investment industry], was 
unaware of these developments in the common law of fraud.  Thus, 
even if we were to agree with the courts below that Congress had 
intended, in effect, to codify the common law of fraud in the [securities 
laws], it would be logical to conclude that Congress codified the 
common law “remedially” as the courts had adapted it to the prevention 
of fraudulent securities transactions by [participants in the securities 
markets], not “technically” as it has traditionally been applied in 
damage suits between parties to arm’s-length transactions involving 
land and ordinary chattels.81 
In sum, Congress intended all securities legislation “‘enacted for the purpose 
of avoiding frauds’ [to be construed], not technically and restrictively, but flexibly 
to effectuate its remedial purposes.”82 
Following Capital Gains Research Bureau, the strongest single case 
supporting the regulatory equity theory is Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
                                                            
78 Id. at 193. 
79 Id. at 194. 
80 Id. at 194 (emphasis added) (citing Ridgely v. Keene, 119 N.Y.S. 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909) 
(illustrating the continuing doctrinal development of fraud in the context of equity)). 
81 Id. at 195 (stating Congress did not codify the common law of fraud and equity in the securities 
laws). 
82 Id. 
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Management Dynamics, Inc.83 The following excerpt from the appellate court’s 
decision is not only illuminating but absolute in its implication: 
The appellants’ crucial error on this score is their assumption that SEC 
enforcement actions seeking injunctions are governed by criteria 
identical to those which apply in private injunction suits.  Unlike private 
actions, which are rooted wholly in the equity jurisdiction of the federal 
court, SEC suits for injunctions are creatures of statute.  Proof of 
irreparable injury or the inadequacy of other remedies as in the usual 
suit for injunction is not required.84 
The Court went on to distinguish the traditional principles of equity when 
ordering an injunction at common law from ordering the same in an SEC 
enforcement action. 
[When] deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, a district court is 
called upon to assess all those considerations of fairness that have been 
the traditional concern of equity courts.  But[,] the statutory imprimatur 
given SEC enforcement proceedings is sufficient to obviate the need for 
a finding of irreparable injury at least where the statutory prerequisite 
the likelihood of future violation of the securities laws has been clearly 
demonstrated.85 
Therefore, in the same way an injunction in the SEC enforcement context can 
be doctrinally distinguished from a traditional order between private parties, 
disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context is distinguishable.  The court 
reasoned: 
The rationale for this rule is readily apparent.  It requires little 
elaboration to make the point that the SEC appears in these proceedings 
not as an ordinary litigant, but as a statutory guardian charged with 
safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws.  Hence, 
by making the showing required by statute that the defendant is engaged 
or about to engage in illegal acts, the Commission is seeking to protect 
the public interest, and the standards of the public interest not the 
requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for 
[equitable] relief.86 
Therefore, in the face of this supreme precedence, any dispositive reliance 
upon the common law of private litigation—when fashioning the disgorgement 
                                                            
83 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975). 
84 Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).  Today, 
following the promulgation of the SERPSRA, disgorgement orders too are creatures of statute, and the 
same analysis applies. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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remedy—is an abuse of the Court’s discretion87 and erodes the deterrent mandate of 
the SEC. 
C. The Disgorgement Cases88 
After Capital Gains Research Bureau, the basic concept underlying 
regulatory equity is clear.  “In an SEC enforcement action, the remedial purpose of 
the statute takes on special importance.”89  As long as it is reasonable, “substantial 
deference is due the construction of a statute made by those charged with its 
execution.”90  When describing the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws, the 
Steadman court stated: “[T]he offenses they define are fraud in the broadest 
‘remedial’ sense of that term and require no showing of intent to injure or injury.”91  
Significantly, when ordering disgorgement, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently 
stated that the federal securities laws, enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds 
must be construed not technically and restrictively[] but flexibly to effectuate their 
remedial purposes.”92  Accordingly, by applying the equitable doctrine of restitution 
with technical exactitude, a court would be ignoring the resolute distinction 
between the common law doctrine of restitution and the doctrine of disgorgement in 
the SEC enforcement context.93  Yet, within this understanding, “once the equity 
jurisdiction of the district court properly has been invoked, the court has power to 
order all equitable relief necessary under the circumstances.  Such discretion in 
fashioning appropriate remedies is a necessary (if unspoken) concomitant of the 
legislative grant of power to enforce the laws.”94  “Unless otherwise provided by 
statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the [d]istrict [c]ourt are available for the 
proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.”95  And, where the inherent 
                                                            
87 See Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 n.8 (2011) (“We 
note, however, that we have previously expressed skepticism over the degree to which the SEC should 
receive deference regarding the private right of action.”).  If the Supreme Court is skeptical deferring to 
the SEC in a private right of action, then, as the article asserts, the converse ought to be true. 
88 With the exception of Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 
1979), these cases all dealt with a disgorgement request by the SEC.  Steadman is cited for the purpose 
of additional doctrinal support during the post Texas Gulf Sulphur disgorgement era. 
89 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Burger, 244 F. Supp. 2d 180, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
90 Steadman, 603 F.2d at 1135. 
91 See id. at 1138; see also Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 
180, 195 (1963). 
92 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866, 875 (S.D. Fla. 1974) 
(quoting Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 195 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
93 See supra Part II.B.3. 
94 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984). 
95 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
(citing Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (codifying the 
ability to set off unjust enrichment explicitly in the text of the trademark laws).  Compare Part IV.C.2 
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equitable powers of the district courts have given gloss to the securities laws, a 
departure from the case law ought to be questioned.96  At bottom, a disgorgement 
order in the SEC enforcement context not only deprives the wrongdoer of benefits 
derived from unlawful conduct, but it also effectuates the purposes underlying the 
securities laws, the protection of the investing public, and the deterrence of future 
violations.97 
D. The Unique Position of the SEC as Party 
The foundational and disgorgement cases in the regulatory equity line are 
powerful evidence of this new theory of equity.  Considerable effort was made in 
the previous sections to touch on the salient cases supporting the distinction 
between common law equity and the kind intended to be applied in SEC 
enforcement actions.  Notably, an additional plinth is found in the fundamental 
difference between a private litigant bringing suit and the SEC bringing suit 
pursuant to its law enforcement authority.  But, what is this fundamental difference, 
and how can it be described? 
To begin, in an SEC enforcement action the judiciary’s jurisprudence does in 
fact change because it is the SEC who is the plaintiff.  However, consider the 
Court’s response in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Management 
Dynamics, Inc.:98 “We scarcely mean to imply that judges are free to set to one side 
all notions of fairness because it is the SEC, rather than a private litigant, which has 
stepped into court.”99  But, “[i]t requires little elaboration to make the point that the 
SEC appears in these proceedings not as an ordinary litigant[] but as a statutory 
guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities 
laws.”100  These passages support the conclusion equity takes on a different gloss 
when the Commission is before the court, but the conclusion is counterbalanced by 
the fungible principle of fairness rooted in all forms of equity.  Our highest Court 
has agreed with this point.  Bolstering the latter quote even further, the Supreme 
Court has said, “[Where] the public interest is involved in a proceeding of this 
nature, .†.†. [a Court’s] equitable powers assume an even broader and more flexible 
                                                            
(limiting the use of the word “all” in this quotation since the legislative history indicates Congress 
desired to define unjust enrichment as the wrongdoer’s “gross pecuniary gain.”).  
96 But see Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88 (W.D.N.Y. 
1990); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 
2010). 
97 See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 
788 F.2d 92, 94 (2nd Cir. 1986) (giving purposeful effect to the remedial scheme intended by Congress). 
98 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975). 
99 Id. at 808. 
100 Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808. 
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character than when only a private controversy is at stake.”101  In short, public 
policy demands a different equitable standard.  
Moreover, we know all uncertainties in the Commission’s disgorgement 
calculation are resolved against the defendant.102  Simply put, the SEC is given the 
benefit of the doubt.  Accordingly, there is a principle of viewing all uncertainties 
surrounding disgorgement in a light most favorable to the Commission.  However, 
this principle applies only in the context of an SEC enforcement suit, where 
deterrence is the key objective, and the SEC has met its burden to show the amount 
to be disgorged is reasonable.103  Endorsing the unique position of the SEC as a 
party, the D.C. district court explained: 
This test applies only in the context of an SEC enforcement suit, where 
deterrence is the key objective.  Where two private parties seek 
monetary remedies, compensation for wrongdoing becomes a more 
important, perhaps the dominant, rationale.  Thus, in a private action, 
the party seeking monetary compensation may have a greater burden to 
prove its claim to the amount requested.104 
Thus, the unique status of the SEC as complaining party is significant because 
it enjoins a new set of legal standards than at common law. 
Management Dynamics’ progeny has continued the development of the 
Commission’s unique litigant status, affirming the “SEC does not stand in the shoes 
of the purchasers and sellers who it asserts were defrauded”105: 
At bottom, the defendants’ arguments rest on the proposition that the 
SEC stands in the shoes of private litigants in bringing this injunctive 
proceeding.  Such an assertion, however, was affirmatively rejected in 
[Securities and Exchange Commission] v. Petrofunds, Inc. 
There is a critical distinction between actions brought by the SEC and 
actions brought by private litigants.  Regardless of the fact that 
defendants may be required to disgorge profits, the SEC in no way 
stands in the shoes of a private litigant with respect to its claims for 
                                                            
101 Porter 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (citations omitted). 
102 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Express, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Miller, 2006 WL 2189697 at 12 (N.D. Ga. July 31, 2006); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2004); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 
WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 
1450, 1475 (2nd Cir. 1996); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1085 
(D.N.J. 1996); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 121–22 (D.C. 1993) (lending 
credence to the assumption all profits gained while defendants were in violation of the law constituted 
ill-gotten gains); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Mich. 
1991); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
103 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232–33 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
104 Id. at 1232 n.24 (citations omitted). 
105 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
154 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. VIII:I 
 
ancillary relief.106 
Therefore, “[o]nce the Commission has established a defendant has violated 
the securities laws, the district court possesses the equitable power to grant 
disgorgement without inquiring whether, or to what extent, identifiable private 
parties have been damaged by the fraud.”107 
From the foregoing, we can conclusively state the equitable standards applied 
in common law suits between competing private interests are not the same 
standards whenever the SEC appears as the plaintiff.  But, what is this “critical 
distinction” between SEC enforcement actions and private suits?  First, as plaintiff, 
the SEC is bringing suit pursuant to its law enforcement mandate.  This distinction 
was noted in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Dimensional Entertainment 
Corp.,108 “[The defendant] contends that disgorgement is appropriate only to 
reimburse those victimized by a defendant’s criminal conduct, not to promote law 
enforcement.†.†. . [The defendant’s] assertion does not persuade the Court that such 
an order is not proper here.”109  Courts in several jurisdictions thus agree “the 
equitable standard to be applied changes when the Commission appears before [the 
Court] as the statutory guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in 
enforcing the securities laws.”110 
Secondly, through the Commission, the United States is acting in its 
sovereign capacity.  “In suing to enforce the securities laws, the SEC is vindicating 
public rights and furthering public interests.”111  The fact the regulatory agency is 
seeking a traditional common law remedy in no way alters this sovereign 
position.112  “Although the Commission may use the disgorged proceeds to 
compensate injured victims, this does not detract from the public nature of 
Commission enforcement actions: the touchstone remains the fact that public 
                                                            
106 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom, 
Lombardfin S.p.A v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988), cert. denied sub nom, Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987); Transatlantic Fin. Co., S.A. v. Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988); see also Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808 (“[T]he SEC appears in 
these proceedings not as an ordinary litigant but as a statutory guardian charged with safeguarding the 
public interest in enforcing the securities laws.”). 
107 Tome, 833 F.2d at 1096 (citing Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
108 493 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
109 Id. at 1283. 
110 Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y.1990) (citing Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808); see also Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great 
Lakes Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Mich. 1991); see generally First City Financial, 890 F.2d at 
1232–33 n.24. 
111 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 963 (1993)). 
112 Calvo, 378 F.3d at 1218. 
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policies are served and the public interest is advanced by the litigation.”113  
Therefore, the critical distinction that sets SEC enforcement actions apart from 
private litigation is the immovable public policy the securities laws be enforced by 
the United States acting in its sovereign capacity.  
Thus, if we juxtapose the traditional equitable principles behind adjudicating 
disputes between private litigants with the public policy and congressional purpose 
behind regulating the financial industry, equitable remedies in pursuit of the latter 
are justified in being more of a bright line.  Accordingly, courts must not so 
ardently eschew from such bright line notions of equity in the regulatory 
enforcement context.114  The doctrinal approach is therefore to apply the securities 
laws in a non-technical and unrestrictive manner.  And, if such an approach allows 
the court to reach the conclusion of liability, flexibility is then exchanged for 
rigidity; for the Court is bound to give effect to the remedial purposes Congress 
intended the securities laws to serve.  Consequently, the malleable common law 
principles used to adjudicate disputes as between private litigants are forged into a 
less forgiving equitable tool.115 
IV. SCOPE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
A. Almost Any Benefit Unjustly Enriches  
It does not make sense to discuss disgorgement and the associated offsetting 
jurisprudence without exploring the scope of what unjustly enriches perpetrators of 
securities fraud.  One of the principle purposes of disgorgement in the SEC 
enforcement context is to prevent the defendant from benefiting from his or her 
fraudulent activities.116  While seemingly innocuous, this opening salvo is actually a 
                                                            
113 Id. (citing Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491–92, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 963 (1993)). 
114 Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973). 
115 In an administrative proceeding, the “fashioning of an appropriate and reasonable remedy is for 
the Commission, not this court, and the Commission’s choice of sanction may be overturned only if it is 
found unwarranted in law or without justification in fact.”  Steadman v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 603 
F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d, 450 U.S. 91, 101 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90, 112–13 (1946) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  Combining this rule of law with the doctrine of Chevron Deference, the author reserves passing 
on the hypothesis whether within the context of administrative rule making, the SEC is able to interpret 
the disgorgement provisions of the securities laws as having the meaning expressed herein.  See also 
Monetta Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 390 F.3d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 2004). 
116 The purpose of disgorgement is to deprive the wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain and to prevent 
unjust enrichment. See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 735 (11th Cir. 
2005); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Burger, 244 F. Supp. 2d 180, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);  aff’d, 322 F.3d 
187 (2d Cir. 1993);  Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 
1998); Hateley v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 8 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1993); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
First City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 
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philosophical gambit.  For regulatory equity to mean anything, and for this article’s 
subsequent denouncement of offsetting disgorgement by direct and general business 
expenses to be feasible, we must infer unjust enrichment as including the broader 
concept of “benefits to the wrongdoer,” rather than simply saying the wrongdoer 
should not profit from his or her wrongdoing.  This notion is not completely without 
support in the case law.  Most notably, we see this with insider trading cases where 
the tipper’s only violation is being the conduit for material, non-public 
information.117  In these instances, despite receiving no money, the courts have 
determined tippers “benefit” from their position as the tipper, as they become 
coveted by those future tippees who demand the material, non-public information 
they are so willing to supply.118  Thus, from the very first successful disgorgement 
case, there has been an acceptance: liable defendants can be unjustly enriched even 
where they receive no monetary enrichment.119 
Insider trading, however, is not the only scenario where this broad notion of 
benefit avoidance can be found.  Most frequently, the maxim wrongdoers should 
not benefit from their wrongdoing is cited to support the imposition of 
prejudgement interest.  Where a defendant has mulcted the public through a scheme 
designed to evade the securities laws, he or she should not get the benefit of an 
interest free loan.120  In one case from the D.C. Circuit, the Court reasoned: 
While it is true that the [d]efendants did not retain possession of the 
funds they collected, having returned most to investors and having used 
the remainder to pay finder’s fees, [another defendant’s] expense, and 
other [firm] expenses, this does not mean that they did not benefit from 
those funds.  The funds were paid out to various [agents of the 
defendant] for the purpose of furthering [the defendant’s] fraudulent 
scheme.  Viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, including 
the statute’s remedial purposes and the need to fully compensate 
investors who have been deprived of the use of these funds for a 
considerable period of time, the [c]ourt finds that an award of 
prejudgment interest on the disgorgement amount is proper.121 
                                                            
F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978). 
117 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).  
The tippers did not receive any pecuniary benefit but were still ordered to disgorge ill-gotten gains.  
118 Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
119 See id. (“As an initial matter, this [c]ourt recognizes [the tipper] received no tangible, monetary 
benefit from the insider trading scheme.  However, in a previous order, this [c]ourt also recognized that 
there is some evidence of an intangible benefit for [the tipper’s] tip to [the tippee], in the form of a gift, 
or improved networking contacts.”). 
120 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Express, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 552, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
aff’d, 438 F. App’x 23 (2d Cir. 2011). 
121 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
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Incredibly, the courts have begun to establish factors to take into 
consideration when determining the amount of prejudgement interest, and whether 
to impose such accumulations at all.122  While this article does not attempt to 
address this issue, it is worth passing perfunctorily upon the legitimacy of such 
analysis.  Especially in light of the thesis painstakingly explicated in this article, 
what should have always been clear ought to now be in sharp relief, “unjust 
enrichment” and “benefit” have broad meaning in the SEC enforcement context.  
Again, fraud is fraud, whether genteel or egregious.  Equity is demeanor agnostic, 
even though civil penalty analysis may take such factors into consideration.  
Accordingly, receipt of ill-gotten gains must always be subject to prejudgement 
interest because the potential for the defendant to earn interest on his or her bounty 
is always available, regardless of whether he or she seeks such accumulations. 
B. Defrayments and Deferrals  
As we have seen in the imposition of prejudgement interest and in the insider 
trading scenario, “[t]he benefit or unjust enrichment of a defendant includes not 
only what it gets to keep in its pocket after the fraud[] but also the value of the other 
benefits the wrongdoer receives through the scheme.”123  But, the scope of benefit is 
not limited to merely these two contexts.  Consider the expenses incurred by a 
nonprofit when it hosts a silent auction.  The proceeds serve two primary purposes.  
Ultimately, the proceeds will fill the nonprofit’s philanthropic coffers but, and most 
importantly for the thesis of this article, only after defraying the costs and expenses 
of the event itself.  Thus, given the purposes of disgorgement as outlined in this 
article, ignoring the benefit of cost defrayment and expense deferrals would be an 
abstruse analytical approach. 
Correctly, the Sixth Circuit has rejected such an approach124 and broadened 
the concept of unjust enrichment to encompass all three categories of the benefit 
principle herein defined125: 
For example, where the expenditures are to defray obligations of the 
wrongdoer, the wrongdoer is benefited by those expenditures.  Thus, 
                                                            
122 There are four factors a court should consider when deciding whether to order prejudgment 
interest: “(1) the need to fully compensate the wronged party for actual damages suffered, (2) 
considerations of fairness and the relative equities of the award, (3) the remedial purpose of the statute 
involved, and/or (4) such other general principles as are deemed relevant by the court . . . . “  Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001) (citing Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1477 (2nd Cir. 1996)). 
123 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Mich. 1991) 
(“The defendants in this case misinterpret the terms ‘profit or benefit’ as they are used in cases ordering 
disgorgement . . . .”). 
124 Id. at 215 n.22. 
125 See Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. Supp. at 211. 
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.†.†. even under defendants’ theory, there is no basis for deducting the 
costs of fixed expenses [because] those expenses would be incurred 
whether or not the fraud took place.  By allowing a deduction for fixed 
expenses, part of the proceeds of the fraud is being used to defer costs 
[the defendants] had to pay in any event, and they would be unjustly 
enriched by those payments.  Clearly, [the defendants] should not be 
allowed to profit by their fraud.126  
“[And], where the expenditures are made to maintain a valuable asset of [the 
defendants], they have benefitted from those expenditures, and the amount of those 
expenditures is not a proper deduction from the amount of unjust enrichment.”127 
As the foregoing sections have made clear, a wrongdoer is unjustly enriched 
by more than mere monetary receipts.128  Unjust enrichment of the defendant can 
constitute benefits in the form of improved reputation, interest free loans, and cost 
defrayments.129  
V. CALCULATING DISGORGEMENT 
In the following sections, the entrenched definition of unjust enrichment as 
net profit will be met head on.  Having laid the foundations of the equitable 
framework in the SEC enforcement context and the broader definition of unjust 
enrichment that it endorses, it becomes quite simple to reject the profit calculation 
of ill-gotten gain in favor of the gross proceeds theory; and, in so doing, firmly 
proving offsetting disgorgment by direct or general business expenses to be 
illegitimate.  
A. Net Profits vs. Gross Proceeds 
The fundamental problem that underlies the “offsetting” debate is, and must 
be, how the courts choose to define ill-gotten gain or unjust enrichment.  This 
article takes the position the proceeds theory of ill-gotten gain, or unjust 
enrichment,130 only applies where the courts are interpreting the remedial purposes 
of the securities laws the agencies are charged with enforcing, rejecting the 
appropriateness of applying the common law principles of equity flowing from 
                                                            




130 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2nd Cir. 
1972) (“Clearly the provision requiring the disgorging of proceeds received in connection with the 
Manor offering was a proper exercise of the district court’s equity powers. The effective enforcement of 
the federal securities laws requires that the SEC be able to make violations unprofitable.”  The Court 
went on to hold “it was appropriate for the district court to order appellants to disgorge the proceeds 
received in connection with the Manor offering.”). 
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private securities actions.131 
Specifically, the central difficulty with the case law involving the SEC’s 
request of disgorgement is the way in which the courts, the Commission, Congress, 
and commentators have all lacked precision when speaking about the purpose of 
disgorgement.  The analysis has been so frustrated due to the use of three phrases: 
profit, ill-gotten gain, and unjust enrichment.  Profit is not the same as ill-gotten 
gain and unjust enrichment.  The latter two are legal terms of art, fashioned to 
characterize the change of wealth realized through illegitimate means.  Therefore, it 
must be more than a curiosity why the common law chose the phrase “ill-gotten 
gain” over “ill-gotten profit.”  Accordingly, the use of the economic term—profit—
is misplaced as a matter of legal significance.  Understandably, the use of the term 
is helpful in an exposition articulating disgorgement.  But, just because the term 
profit aids the courts, the Commission, Congress, and commentators in explaining 
how disgorgement seeks to remove the incentive behind violating the securities 
laws, it does not mean it is proper to employ the economist’s tool of profit to 
calculate the jurist’s remedy of disgorgement.  
The struggle between profits and proceeds, and the resulting confusion, was 
evident early in the development of the disgorgement doctrine.  The court in Blatt 
stated, “In [Securities and Exchange Commission] v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 
that the court held that the trial court erred in ordering restitution of income earned 
on ill-gotten profits.  The court held that the defendant could be compelled only to 
disgorge profits and interest wrongfully obtained.”132 
Manor Nursing Centers, however, dealt with an order to disgorge any 
proceeds, profits, and income received in connection with the sale of the common 
stock, which is a more inclusive characterization of ill-gotten gain.133  Still, Blatt 
chose to interpret Manor Nursing Centers as using a profit calculation where the 
court explicitly stated “proceeds.”134  “We hold that it was appropriate for the 
district court to order appellants to disgorge the proceeds received in connection 
with the Manor [Nursing Centers] offering.”135  At bottom, the confusion stems 
from the simple fact profits, proceeds, gains, and benefit are not all the same 
calculation, but all have been used to describe the same thing, ill-gotten gain or 
                                                            
131 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974) 
(common law equitable principles are not used to give effect to the remedial purposes of the securities 
laws); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(4)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (a 
wrongdoer may be given a credit for expenses).  But see Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb 
Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (when disgorging fees and commissions earned, the 
defendant can deduct transaction costs such as brokerage commissions incurred). 
132 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). 
133 Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104. 
134 Notably, Manor Nursing did speak of “proceeds” and “illicit profit” in the same respect. While 
the ambiguous treatment did not change the result, it did add to lexicographic confusion. 
135 Id. at 1104 (emphasis added). 
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unjust enrichment.  Courts have even used both “profits” and “proceeds” to describe 
unjust enrichment in the same breath.136 
Thus far, we have seen how the courts have used a profit theory and a 
proceeds theory to calculate the defendant’s unjust enrichment.  However, neither 
calculation has elicited resounding support in lieu of the other.  The profit theory of 
ill-gotten gain is arguably too under-inclusive, and, on the other hand, the gross 
proceeds theory is arguably over-inclusive.137  It has also been suggested the facts 
and circumstances of the case can dictate the choice.138  “The Court may order 
disgorgement in the amount of the wrongdoer’s total gross profits, without giving 
consideration to whether or not the defendant may have squandered and/or hidden 
the ill-gotten profits.”139  So, is the profit theory really under-inclusive?  Or, does 
the non-punitive standard require the gross proceeds calculation to be considered 
over-inclusive?140  As we proceed, keep in mind the holding from Texas Gulf 
Sulphur.  Specifically, if Texas Gulf Sulphur allows for a tipper to be responsible 
for disgorging a tippee’s ill-gotten gains, then the concept of non-punitive 
disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action is broad. 
To reconcile the choice between the two theories, we must return to the 
philosophy underlying disgorgement—the giving up of an ill-received benefit.  
Accordingly, we know the disgorgement doctrine in the SEC enforcement context 
will not give the wrongdoer the benefit of the doubt.141  Still, where a defendant had 
diligently kept records allowing an exact calculation of net illicit profits, thus 
                                                            
136 See, e.g., Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2nd Cir. 1984) (recognizing 
both profits and proceeds characterization (citing Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1082); Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104; see also 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080 (D.N.J. 1996) (demonstrating the 
characterization confusion in a case adjudicated after the promulgation of the SERPSRA). 
137 See Securities and Exchange Commission v. McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 
2002), where the proceeds or gain theory of unjust enrichment would capture the receipts from wash 
trades during a sixteen day window while ignoring losses incurred on wash trades realized outside that 
window.  Id.  Because the negative wash trades were part and parcel of the fraudulent artifice, at least as 
much as the positive wash trades were, the defendant was not enriched by its scheme.  Id.  Thus, in this 
instance, the court held the gross receipts theory was over-inclusive.  Id.  Where a defendant’s losses are 
part and parcel of its fraudulent scheme, such losses are distinguishable from those losses incurred after a 
law enforcement agency intervenes and may therefore be properly considered.  Contrastingly, the profit 
theory, as this article seeks to explain, is almost always under-inclusive.  Cf. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Mayhew, 916 F. Supp. 123, 132 (D. Conn. 1995), aff’d on other grounds, 121 F.3d 44 (2nd Cir. 1997) 
(holding losses during same trading period not considered). 
138 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1133–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
139 See Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2. 
140 Id.; see also Thomas James Assocs., 738 F. Supp. at 95. 
141 Any uncertainty in the amount to be disgorged should rest on the wrongdoer whose fraudulent 
activity created such uncertainty.  See supra Part II. 
2014 DERANGED DISGORGEMENT 161 
 
creating no uncertainty, courts are more inclined to adopt the profit theory.142  
When, in the first instance, the meticulous fraudster is only liable to disgorge net 
profits, and, in the same breath, the unorganized wrongdoer feels the burden of 
uncertainty by disgorging gross proceeds, the courts unnecessarily force the 
distillatory mission of the SEC into brackish waters.143  Is not the broad remedial 
scheme embodied in the securities laws betrayed by allowing differing results based 
upon the sophistication of the defendant?  The answer to the question must be yes.  
Consider the following two case studies.  
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Berlacher,144 the defendant 
performed insider trading temporally with a Private Investment in Public Equity 
(PIPE) transaction.145  There, the court recognized the two lines of cases that have 
formed around using business expenses as offsets to disgorgement.146  The court 
held it was within its broad equitable powers to choose the net profit calculation 
                                                            
142 “Economic profit is defined to be the difference between the revenue a firm receives and the costs 
that it incurs.”  HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23 (3rd ed. 1992).  While that definition 
carries water in the boardroom, it must drown in the courtroom.  This would be tantamount to allowing 
Bonnie and Clyde to reduce the amount of money they stole by the cost of bullets, guns, and gas.  While 
it is well settled law the amount the SEC seeks in disgorgement does not have to be refined with 
technical precision, a mere reasonable approximation is sufficient.  However, it is not the intent of this 
article to assert the definition of economic profit fails in the courtroom in all contexts.  Rather, this 
author seeks to contribute a thoughtful critique of the economic term as applied to capturing unjust 
enrichment solely within the context of SEC enforcement actions. 
143 To ensure disgorgement does not work a punishment, the Commission: 
 
generally must distinguish between legally and illegally obtained profits. . . . If 
exact information were obtainable at negligible cost, we would not hesitate to 
impose upon the government a strict burden to produce that data to measure the 
precise amount of the ill-gotten gains.  Unfortunately, we encounter imprecision 
and imperfect information.  Despite sophisticated econometric modeling, 
predicting stock market responses to alternative variables is, as the district court 
found, at best speculative.  Rules for calculating disgorgement must recognize 
that separating legal from illegal profits exactly may at times be a near-
impossible task. 
 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
144 2010 WL 3566790 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010). 
145 Berlacher dealt with a PIPE transaction.  It is done when a publicly traded company needs an 
immediate infusion of cash.  Id. at *1.  The company gets the cash from private investors in exchange for 
an allotment of shares that are restricted and typically discounted from market value.  Id.  After a 
prescribed period of time—usually three to four months—the SEC allows the registration statements for 
the shares to become active, thereby permitting those shares to be traded publicly.  Id.  The details of the 
transaction are kept confidential until negotiations are complete and the transactions take place.  Id.  
PIPEs tend to depress the stock’s price due to dilution effects.  Id.  However, if existing shares from a 
large share holder are privately sold, then the share price is not at risk to price depression due to market 
dilution.  Id.  Nevertheless, the price may still be impacted by the PIPE announcement due to inferences 
the market may draw as a result of the PIPE itself.  Id. 
146 2010 WL 3566790 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010). 
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over the gross profit calculation because adequate evidence was available to 
perform a reasonably accurate net profit calculation.147  Unjust enrichment was 
therefore equal to net profits.  But, does this send the signal as long as a wrongdoer 
keeps detailed records he or she will benefit from her balance sheet and only be 
forced to disgorge less than the unorganized fraudster?  Is this equity?  Is this 
deterrence?  Not only should the risk of uncertainty in the calculation fall upon the 
shoulders of the defendant, but should not the gross profits—total proceeds—as 
well?  Compare Berlacher with Securities and Exchange Commission v. Calvo: 
Where a defendant’s record-keeping or lack thereof has so obscured 
matters that calculating the exact amount of illicit gains cannot be 
accomplished without incurring inordinate expense, it is well within the 
district court’s discretion to rule that the amount of disgorgement will 
be the more readily measurable proceeds received from the unlawful 
transactions.148  
Accordingly, there is a pervasive and deleterious fallacy in disgorgement 
doctrine when two fraudsters mulct a million dollars each, but the one with the best 
bookkeeper gets to disgorge less.  
The conclusion of impropriety rests upon settled notions of legitimacy.  Bona 
fide business ventures that operate within their respective regulatory environments 
rightfully identify their gain, reduced by expenses, as profit.  Allowing illegitimate 
businesses, or other fraudulent schemes, to enjoy the connotations of economic 
profit when calculating ill-gotten gain, perverts the notion itself.  Even more 
fundamentally, profit is a two step analysis, whereas ill-gotten gain is but one.  
Profit asks: What did you receive, and what did you spend?; whereas, ill-gotten gain 
simply asks: What did you receive?  To this end, disgorgement commands the 
defendant to give back what was received.  The pro-offsetting line of cases insists 
on forcing an illegitimate square peg in a legitimate round hole.  Because fraudulent 
schemes lack the legitimacy of bona fide business ventures, the reliance upon the 
legitimate measure of profit is misplaced.  
Lastly, it is important to note the current treatment in the pro-offsetting 
opinions lends itself to gamesmanship.  That is, if one was going to pursue a 
fraudulent scheme in the securities market, they should at least do it expensively. 
Which raises an additional consideration, What if the liable defendant used the 
proceeds from an unlawful distribution of securities, or from a pump and dump 
scheme to pay for business expenses?  The precedent set by the pro-offsetting 
courts leads us to the unsettling conclusion: deterrence is indeed a chimera.  In this 
scenario the unscrupulous would have no skin in the game, merely the hides of 
innocent investors, and it is they who will bear the expenses of the fraud. 
                                                            
147 Id. 
148 Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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B. Technical Transgressions and Judicial Discretion 
Although the rejection of the profit theory pervades this article, readers 
should not conclude the “gross proceeds” or “gross pecuniary benefit” calculations 
replace the profit calculation in all instances.  Where a mere technical transgression 
of the securities laws has occurred, such as an elapsed filing deadline, the courts 
would be justified in ordering the disgorgement of net profits, choosing the 
imposition of a statutorily mandated fine, or imposing both.149  Such a decision 
would be within the discretionary authority of the judiciary.  Yet, where the 
violation is not a mere technical transgression, the egregiousness or degree of 
scienter is inapposite when determining the amount of disgorgement.  
With respect to this point, it is important to note a court’s tradition of 
discretion by way of this article has not been completely abrogated.  As indicated, 
the equitable powers of the court may be used to decide which calculation of ill-
gotten gains to employ based upon the following analysis.  Mere technical 
violations of the securities laws, devoid of scienter, do not require gross gain 
calculation of disgorgement to achieve deterrence.150  However, a finding of 
scienter indicates a willingness to rebuff the securities laws in no uncertain terms. 
Therefore, the gross gain calculation of ill-gotten gains must be used.  
Finally, the courts have been incorrect when using egregiousness as a 
prophylactic measure, insulating funds from disgorgement.151  Defrauding 
sophisticated investment bankers out of one million dollars, through an equally 
sophisticated scheme, procures no less when perpetrated against pensioners.  From 
the soccer mom tippee trading between errands to the egregiously faithless 
fiduciary, total disgorgement of illicitly procured benefits is to be made.  Fraud is 
fraud, and speaking the Queen’s English while excising your pound of flesh does 
not make what you took less than a pound.  Thus, egregiousness does not thumb the 
scale in regulatory equity analysis and should be reserved for the determination of 
civil penalties.152 
                                                            
149 See Hateley v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 8 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1993); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
150 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Classic Min. Corp., 1986 WL 10898 (M.D. Tenn. July 31, 1986) 
(holding, even where a preliminary or permanent injunction has been imposed, the court may not order 
disgorgement pending a conclusive finding of securities violations and findings on the degree of 
scienter). 
151 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.12 (9th Cir. 
2006); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
152 However, egregiousness and scienter do play an integral role when determining civil penalties 
under the securities laws.  In the insider trading context, see Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Chapnick, 1994 
WL 113040 at 4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 1994) and Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Brethan, 1992 WL 420867 at 
25 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
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VI. REGULATORY EQUITY APPLIED 
A. Direct and Transactional Costs 
It is important to note the nature of the defendant’s fraudulent scheme has 
undoubtedly influenced many judges’ equitable reasoning.  Consider the following 
two hypotheticals.  First, Johnny promises to pay you one dollar tomorrow if you 
lend him one dollar today.  Tomorrow comes, goes, and Johnny does not pay you 
back.  We can call this a “naked fraudulent scheme.”  Second, Jane sells you a one-
dollar cup of lemonade and promises you the drink is made from fresh squeezed 
lemon juice.  Later, you see Jane making the lemonade from a powder mix and hear 
her tell her mother she needs more lemonade powder.  We can call this a “disguised 
fraudulent scheme.”  
The first scenario contains little to no expense associated with execution.  By 
contrast, the second scenario requires start-up costs to make the first cup of 
lemonade—water, lemonade mix, and building the lemonade stand.  Should it 
matter the funds used to purchase these instrumentalities of Jane’s fraud were as of 
then untainted?  What if Jane put the illicitly obtained, and therefore tainted, 
proceeds towards buying fresh lemons to squeeze—towards legitimate purposes? 
Although common law equity may require us to take these expenses into 
consideration when fashioning our remedy,153 the argument herein is such 
considerations are not in line with the remedial regulatory regime controlling the 
United States securities industry.  Analyzing the first scenario, the federal courts 
would define unjust enrichment as total payments received or one dollar.  In the 
second, they seem to be inclined to apply a profit theory to unjust enrichment, 
which is more akin to the common law principles of equity and restitution.  
Accordingly, Jane would be permitted to adduce detailed expense reports and 
accountings of her lemonade business to arrive at the conclusion the profit she made 
on the cup sold to you was fifty cents.  Therefore unjust enrichment was not one 
dollar, but rather half that amount.  
Perhaps under common law equitable principles these two approaches would 
be consistent when adjudicating disputes as they arise between private litigants.  
But, as this article has routinely noted by citing to the Supreme Court and other 
SEC enforcement actions,154 equitable principles applied within a regulatory 
framework take on a broader focus and are not required to be as technically applied 
as in a dispute between private litigants.  Accordingly, the equitable remedy of 
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions is sui generis. 
The increasing willingness of the judiciary to recognize offsetting cuts against 
                                                            
153 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(4)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (a wrongdoer 
may be given a credit for expenses). 
154 See supra Part III.D 
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the enforcement efforts by the investment industry’s regulators, whether a naked 
fraud or one disguised as a business.  The analysis begs the question whether there 
is a compelling fundamental difference between the above fraudulent schemes 
within the context of SEC enforcement actions, and whether such a difference 
justifies using different characterizations of unjust enrichment.  Admittedly, the 
second scheme cost money to perpetrate.  Nevertheless, just because a defendant 
chooses a more expensive, and potentially lucrative, way to mulct the public, it does 
not mean he or she gets to make above-the-line and below-the-line deductions to his 
or her illicit proceeds.  Even when a defendant has put his or her unjust enrichment 
to bona fide purposes, the SEC and the Court cannot turn a blind eye.  Once defined 
as unjust enrichment, supported by evidence, such funds are forever tainted.155 
For the statutory purpose of deterrence to be meaningful, fraudulent 
contrivances cannot be given the benefit of their balance sheet.  As it has been 
repeatedly argued, whether this is consistent with common law principles of equity 
as they relate to private litigants is irrelevant.  Within an SEC enforcement context, 
there are no fundamental differences between the schemes, and disgorgement of the 
gross pecuniary gain is justified.  The general business expenses incurred by the 
defendant, affording him or her the opportunity to violate the securities laws and 
erode the integrity of the capital markets, are therefore nugatory.156 
Curiously, the cases do not show a strong resistance by the Commission or 
the judiciary to the netting out of brokerage fees, despite the fairly consistent 
argument  business costs incurred by defendants should not be used to offset 
disgorgement.  We are then compelled to ask whether there is a fundamental 
difference between fraudulent schemes centered on the purchase and sale of 
securities, from unregistered offerings and Ponzi schemes, high risk startups, etc., 
all of which involve costs analogous to operational or business expenses.  If so, we 
are then drawn to know whether such a fundamental difference warrants the broad 
acceptance of offsetting ill-gotten gains by the brokerage fees incurred.157  
Ultimately, does distinguishing between direct transactional costs and general 
business expenses make sense in light of the unique law enforcement role of the 
                                                            
155 See supra Part II.B.1. 
156 The overwhelming weight of authority holds securities law violators may not offset their 
disgorgement liability with business expenses.  See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & 
Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 
2004 WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18), cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1998); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (D.N.J. 1996); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes 
Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214–15, n. 22 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. World 
Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984). 
157 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“At least one 
court has reduced the disgorgement remedy by the amount a defendant paid to his broker, in recognition 
of the fact that money paid for broker fees cannot be unjust enrichment or an ill-gotten gain.”). 
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SEC? 
In the latter scenarios, the key doctrinal concept is all costs become ex post 
facto tainted.  Such costs can be those associated with the defendant’s fraud or those 
proximate expenses affording the defendant his or her ability to violate the 
securities laws.  This concept derives legitimacy from significant case law 
supporting the proposition the equitable standards to be applied in SEC enforcement 
actions are fundamentally different from traditional common law principles of 
equity and restitution.  Thus, disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action casts a 
broader net than at common law.158 
Furthermore, applying the gross proceeds theory to frauds centered around 
the purchase and sale of a security deserves separate treatment because doing so 
would be a sweeping shift in the current state of the law.  As previously mentioned, 
in many cases the SEC, the courts, and the defense bar all agree broker fees 
associated with the trades by an insider are legitimate offsets to disgorgement.159  
Supporting this conclusion, some courts have erected a hermetic distinction 
between direct transactional costs and general business expenses.160  And, as the 
adroit D.C. Circuit so presciently averred, “Placing the burden on the defendants of 
rebutting the SEC’s showing of actual profits, we recognize, may result, as it has in 
the insider trader context, in actual profits becoming the typical disgorgement 
measure.”161  But, is this result correct?  Should the investment industry, the public, 
or Congress simply yield to fallacious inertia?  The remainder of this section 
explains why the answer to these questions is no.  
A broker fee is a type of transaction cost.  Taking into account these costs 
entirely when calculating ill-gotten gain bases unjust enrichment on the profit 
theory.  This is an incorrect result.  The central principle that courses through the 
lines of this article is the defendant who has been found liable for violating the 
                                                            
158 In Capital Gains Research Bureau, and First City Financial, the courts held the standard to be 
applied differs from the common law when the SEC appears as the “statutory guardian” charged with 
safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws.  Additionally, in Penn Central, the court 
held the SEC does not stand in the shoes of individual investors who it asserts were harmed.  Moreover, 
the intent of Congress was to establish a broad remedial scheme in the regulation of the investment 
industry, reflecting the need to promote the highest standards of ethics and professionalism in the 
management of, and transactions in, securities.  Thus, the technical application of common law 
restitution was never intended to apply in SEC enforcement actions seeking disgorgement.  
159 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Universal Express, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 118612 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2001); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Shah, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros., 734 F. Supp. 
1071, 1077 (S.D.N.Y.1990). 
160 McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4 n.6 (declaring brokerage fees should be distinguished from 
general business expenses and should not offset disgorgement). 
161 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 
1989); cf. Universal Express, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 564; McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4; Rosenfeld, 2001 
WL 118612 at 2; Shah, 1993 WL 288285; Litton Indus., 734 F. Supp. at 1077. 
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securities laws benefits by his or her illicit gains in an amount greater than mere net 
profits.  The broad remedial scheme originally intended by Congress and accepted 
by the Supreme Court cannot tolerate discretionary decisions by the lower courts 
endorsing a defendant’s defrayment of outlays and deferral of costs.  Whether the 
outlays or costs were associated with their fraud or just afforded them the 
opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, the conclusion is the same.  When a defendant 
enters and exits an unlawful trade and incurs a cost to do so—a broker’s 
commission—his or her profits are what is left after the broker takes his or her cut.  
These broker fees associated with the defendant’s navigation into and out of his or 
her unlawful trade were simply the costs of committing fraud and should not be 
used to offset disgorgement.162 
Admittedly, when the average investor evaluates the result of a stock trade, he 
or she must look at all he or she has received, less any costs associated with the 
trade.  This method shows the investor his or her profit.  But, equating the profits of 
a bona fide investor with the ill-gotten gain of a liable defendant betrays the 
remedial purpose behind the securities laws.  Thus, in the insider trading context, 
the calculation of ill-gotten gain need not take into consideration the cost of 
entering and exiting the trade.  
Consider the insider trading context.  It seems quite simple to accept the 
reasoning behind denying an offset for the costs associated with exiting a position 
on the basis of material, non-public information.163  When a defendant exits a 
position he or she so entered, or is selling because of the same, he or she embraces a 
mental state to deceive the SEC and the investing public.164  Thus, these brokerage 
costs are direct costs of perpetrating a fraud.  The direct costs or transactional costs 
associated with securities fraud should not insulate disgorgement.165  When a court 
is faced with deciding on whom to place the market’s loss, the entire weight must 
rest squarely on the shoulders of the liable defendant.  To the extent the defense bar 
would argue disgorgement of gross proceeds without netting out brokerage fees 
constitutes a penalty by forcing a defendant to give up more than he or she received, 
the argument ignores reality.  Whether a defendant pays all fees up front and out of 
pocket, or uses illicitly procured funds to satisfy the broker, the defendant has 
                                                            
162  The ability to recoup the costs associated with a defendant’s securities violation, whether the 
costs were at the time incurred in anticipation of fraud or in the pursuit of bona fide trade or business, is 
a benefit unlawfully conferred.  Keep in mind this reasoning flows from the broader remedial purposes 
of securities regulation, which is not a codification of the common law philosophies of equity and 
restitution. 
163 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2004) (setting out the 
case against an insider). 
164 Id. 
165 Cf. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790 at 15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010);  
Universal Express, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 564; McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 4; Rosenfeld, 2001 WL 
118612 at 2; Shah, 1993 WL 288285; Litton Indus., 734 F. Supp. at 1077. 
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chosen to squander his or her enrichment and impose the pangs of punishment upon 
him- or herself.  Brokerage fee defrayment is therefore illegitimate and inconsistent 
with the remedial scheme of the securities laws, which have adopted the gross 
pecuniary gain definition of unjust enrichment.166 
Additionally, and somewhat less intuitively, we must consider the scenario in 
which the defendant has lawfully, and without premeditation, entered into a trade 
that he or she subsequently exited illicitly.  In such an instance, the cost of entering 
into the insider’s position was not initially shrouded in a patina of deceit.  However, 
once the transaction has been proven to have been based on material, non-public 
information, the entry fee associated with taking the position becomes tainted ex 
post facto.  This brings the doctrine of disgorgment in insider trading cases brought 
by the SEC in line with the proceeds theory proffered in this article.  Thus, because 
the profit theory of ill-gotten gain would further reduce disgorgement by the cost of 
entering the trade—thereby conferring a benefit to the defendant in the form of an 
unlawful defrayment—staying the course in these cases would be incompatible with 
the broad remedial scheme intended by Congress.  Thus, offsetting disgorgement in 
the insider trading context by the brokerage fees associated with entry and exit are 
no more appropriate than offsetting disgorgement by general business outlays 
incurred during the pursuit of any other fraudulent scheme. 
Next, consider a fraudulent scheme in which a defendant has made material 
misrepresentations causing the price of a security to rise.  The defendant purchased 
the security at five dollars and subsequently sold it for ten dollars.  The benefit to 
the defendant causally connected to the unlawful activity was the five-dollar 
increase in the price of the security.  Assuming a ten percent brokerage commission, 
the transactional costs associated with the trade are fifty cents entering the position 
and one dollar exiting.  To the lawful investor, the profit from this transaction 
would be three dollars and fifty cents.  But, for the defendant found liable for 
pumping the stock, would the net profit calculation truly capture the defendant’s 
benefit?  What if the defendant hired an innocent assistant to answer the phone and 
make photocopies of false reports?  Would the net profit be further reduced by 
those overhead expenses?  Plainly not.  The philosophical purposes of disgorgement 
in SEC enforcement actions are clear.167  To deprive the wrongdoer of his or her ill-
gotten gains, all five dollars of proceeds must be disgorged, otherwise the defendant 
unjustly receives a benefit in the form of cost defrayments and deferrals.  
Finally, there is the matter of wash trades.  A wash trade scheme gives the 
illusion of volume or trading activity in the targeted security.  In certain instances, 
the scheme has the effect of stabilizing the price of a security, which can be 
                                                            
166 S. REP. No. 101-337, at 11 (1990) (defining unjust enrichment as gross pecuniary gain); see also, 
Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
1005 (1971) (establishing a broad definition of “punitive” in the SEC enforcement context). 
167 See supra Part II. 
2014 DERANGED DISGORGEMENT 169 
 
extremely beneficial to one who wants the security’s price to stay aloft.  Typically, 
the conductor of the wash trade scheme accounts for a non-trivial percentage of the 
security’s trading volume.168 
A wash trade scheme is usually executed by two types of transactions: wash 
sales and matched orders.  Wash sales are transactions having no change in 
beneficial ownership, and matched orders are defined as orders for the purchase or 
sale of a security that are entered with the knowledge orders of substantially the 
same size, at substantially the same time and price, have been or will be entered by 
the same or different persons for the sale or purchase of such security.169  The 
question remains whether a defendant who realizes losses in the pursuit of illicit 
proceeds should be given credit for those losses.  When the losses are less than 
proceeds, the foregoing sections argue such losses are not valid offsets to 
disgorgement.  Yet, in the instance where the defendants’ losses were greater than 
or equal to the proceeds from the wash trades, courts have argued there is no unjust 
enrichment.170 
However, this is an incorrect result under the regulatory equity thesis and 
should not be the case henceforth.  If a defendant put untainted proceeds, or those 
tainted funds from positive wash trades, to use in trades resulting in a loss, the 
overwhelming weight of authority, in addition to the thesis of this article, supports 
not giving the defendant credit for those losses in the form of an offset to 
disgorgement in which the trading activity was part and parcel of the securities 
violation.171  The broad remedial scheme intended by Congress calls upon the 
defining of unjust enrichment to include those benefits, not just those pure profits or 
proceeds, garnered by the wrongdoer.  Loss defrayment is quite clearly a benefit 
conferred by the proceeds of a wash trade, in addition to the stabilizing, or other 
desired market effects of the scheme.172  Moreover, “in determining how much 
should be disgorged in a case in which defendants have manipulated securities so as 
to mulct the public,” there is no reason why “the court must give them credit for the 
                                                            
168 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).  
Defendant accounted for ninety-nine percent of the trading volume in the targeted security.  Id. 
169 Id. at 1 n.1. 
170 See McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 at 1 (using the net profit theory). 
171 The overwhelming weight of authority holds securities law violators may not offset their 
disgorgement liability with business expenses.  See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & 
Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 
2004 WL 315185 at 2 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2004), cert. denied sub nom, 543 U.S. 1034 (2004); Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 1998); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1087 (D.N.J. 1996); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes 
Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214-15, n. 22 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. World 
Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. 
dismissed, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984).  Of course when faced with this or a similar set of facts, the SEC 
would likely reflect upon the propriety of pursuing full disgorgement despite being entitled to do so. 
172 JT Wallenbrock, 440 F.3d 1109 (asserting investment losses are not offsets). 
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fact that they had not succeeded in” avoiding losses.173  Even where the value of 
illicit benefits is not readily available, as in the value of illicitly stabilizing a stock 
price, courts have still been willing to order disgorgement.174  Just as the tipper, 
whose only violative act is to misappropriate material, non-public information, is 
liable to disgorge the gains of his or her tippee,175 courts may use the more easily 
quantifiable monetary benefits flowing from the securities laws violation as a proxy 
for those benefits not so trivially appraised.  
At bottom, using illicitly obtained funds to defray the impact of associated 
losses is unconscionable in light of the law enforcement role of the SEC, the broad 
remedial scheme intended, the object of deterrence, the promotion of ethics, and the 
knife to the throat of the economy that members of the investment industry can so 
easily draw.  While the offsetting of disgorgement by amounts incurred in 
brokerage fees originated as an equitable bromide, it has since frustrated the 
deterrent purposes of the securities laws’ remedial scheme.  Nevertheless, such 
wholesale allowances are both unfaithful to the remedial purpose of the investment 
industry’s regulatory framework and the proceeds theory of unjust enrichment, 
which it arguably endorses.  Because the costs incurred while performing insider 
trading and other fraudulent security transactions are not fundamentally different 
from those general business expenses incurred in other fraudulent securities 
schemes, a setoff in the amount of brokerage fees is likewise not appropriate.  
Consistency is the hallmark of effective deterrence, and deterrence is the great 
object of enforcement.  Therefore, the Supreme Court’s broad remedial 
interpretation of the securities laws demands nothing less than the disgorgement of 
gross proceeds in every non-technical violation of the securities regulations.  
B. Windfall Accumulations on Ill-gotten Gains 
Where the disgorgement calculation is over-encompassing by including 
profits and income earned on the proceeds of a defendant’s securities violation, 
some courts have found it proper to reduce disgorgement by the amount of those 
profits and income.  On appellate review, the court in Manor Nursing Centers said: 
Having held that ordering the refunding of the proceeds was a proper 
exercise of the district court’s equity powers, we hold that the court 
erred in ordering appellants to transfer to the trustee all the profits and 
income earned on such proceeds.†.†. .We believe that ordering the 
disgorging of profits and income earned on the proceeds is in fact a 
penalty assessment.†.†. .The only plausible justification for this part of 
                                                            
173 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Common Wealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2nd Cir. 1978). 
174 See generally McCaskey, 2002 WL 850001 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). 
175 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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the court’s order is that the deterrent force of requiring the disgorging of 
the profits on the proceeds is essential to effective enforcement of the 
federal securities laws.  In balance, however, we believe that the 
injunctive relief and the requirement that the proceeds be returned are 
sufficient deterrence to further violations.176 
Supporting this finding of error, the court said, “This provision of the order 
cannot be justified as remedial relief to purchasers of [the company’s] shares.  As 
defrauded purchasers in a private enforcement action, public investors would be 
entitled to recover only the excess of what they paid over the value of what they 
got.”177 
However, this rationale is misplaced because courts are not limited by 
amounts private litigants could receive as damages.  “Unlike damages, 
disgorgement is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he 
was unjustly enriched.”178  Moreover, Manor Nursing Center’s reasoning is fatally 
flawed because a court is not restricted in an SEC enforcement action by the 
equitable principles applied in cases between competing private interests.179  “The 
amount to be disgorged is not limited as a matter of law to the damages inflicted 
upon purchasers and sellers.  The SEC does not stand in the shoes of the purchasers 
and sellers who it asserts were defrauded.”180 
The broad remedial scheme intended by Congress accepts no benefit 
conferred upon the wrongdoer, even by his or her own toil, if his or her violative 
acts afforded him or her the opportunity to reap the blossoms he or she had sewn.  
At common law, however, this principle is limited.  “If an artist acquired paints by 
fraud and used them in producing a valuable portrait we would not suggest that the 
defrauded party would be entitled to the portrait[] or to the proceeds of its sale.”181  
But, the gravity of the deterrent purposes behind disgorgement in the SEC 
enforcement context and the fact the SEC does not stand in the shoes of private 
litigants seeking to be made whole,182 must deprive a wrongdoer of all benefits 
flowing from his or her violation.183 
                                                            
176 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2nd Cir. 1972). 
177 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790 at 14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010). 
179 See supra Part III.D. 
180 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908, 916 (D.C. Pa.1978). 
181 Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st Cir. 1965). 
182 Penn Cent., 450 F. Supp. at 916. 
183 The court has the discretion to fashion whatever equitable relief it deems necessary to deprive 
defendants of all gains flowing from the wrong.  See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & 
Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773 
(E.D. Pa. 2005); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Rogers, 2000 WL 642467 at 1 (9th Cir. May 18, 2000); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. Cross Fin. Servs., 908 F. Supp. 718, 734 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Penn Cent., 450 F. Supp. at 916–17. 
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Consider the rationale behind ordering prejudgement interest on a 
wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gain.  It has been characterized as denying the defendant the 
“benefit” of an interest free loan.184  Here, the terms “benefit” and “windfall” can be 
used interchangeably.  Interest is windfall based on the idea that otherwise the 
defendant gets the benefit of an interest free loan.  But, what if the illicit proceeds 
are creatively invested as a result of the skill and talents of the wrongdoer?  At 
common law, this would be analogous to the artist using stolen paints to complete 
his or her masterpiece.  There, disgorgement would be limited to the value of the 
stolen paint.  However, is the SEC enforcement context the same thing?  If you 
have made it this far in the article, then you already know the answer.  Of course it 
is not.  The SEC does not regulate mere arms length transactions of chattels, nor 
does it stand in the shoes of private litigants.185  Unlike damages, disgorgement is a 
method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he or she was 
unjustly enriched.186  Thus, in light of the subsequent doctrinal development, the 
court in Manor Nursing Centers got this wrong.  Those windfall accumulations 
proximately traced to the defendant’s illicitly garnered proceeds are as tainted in the 
eyes of an SEC enforcement context as the illicit proceeds themselves.  
Plainly, a wrongdoer is not to reap benefits that flow from violating the law.  
But, if one violates the securities laws, receives illicit gains from the violation, and, 
through his or her own efforts, devises a way to earn money from those illicit 
proceeds, he or she has benefited.  To give effect to the deterrent purposes of 
disgorgement, the remedial scheme must have a way to neutralize secondary and 
tertiary benefits flowing from the securities violation.  Including those subsequent 
gains a defendant earns through his or her own creative efforts is the only way to 
ensure a defendant does not benefit from his or her violation.187 
Disgorgement, constrained by gross pecuniary gain, can never be a penalty.  
But, for the defendant’s conscious and deliberate efforts, no gain at all would have 
been mulcted.  The defendant’s costs were conceived, calculated, anticipated, and, 
in all other respects, voluntarily self-imposed.  The allocation of ill-gotten gains, to 
waste, windfall, or work of financial art, is of no moment.  Courts will find support 
for this conclusion in the regulatory equity line of cases.  Therefore, the gross gain 
                                                            
184 See supra Part II. 
185 See supra Part III.D. 
186 See supra Part II. 
187 While it is already clear disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context is not restitution, this body 
of law can continue to inform the doctrine as it continues to solidify.  Regarding the subsequent use of 
ill-gotten gains, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(4) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) instructs, 
(a) Profit includes any form of secondary enrichment that is identifiable and measurable on the facts of 
the case and not unduly remote; and (b) A wrongdoer who makes unauthorized investments of the 
claimant’s assets is accountable for profits and liable for losses.  These two rules are used when the profit 
theory would provide a greater amount to be disgorged than the market value of the benefit wrongfully 
obtained.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 51(2)–(3) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). 
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calculation is the ballast to right the ship.  
VII. CRITIQUE OF OFFSETTING CASES 
A. Introduction 
A thorough critique of Thomas James Associates will demonstrate how the 
Court ignored over a half a century of doctrinal development, willfully altering the 
landscape of equity in SEC enforcement actions.  To begin, let us recall LATDME 
set out the earliest criteria by which the courts must adhere when fashioning 
equitable remedies under the securities laws: “[T]he statutory policy in the mind of 
the Congress in passing SEC regulations to afford ‘broad protection to investors is 
not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae.’”188  While in the first 
instance, the amount to be disgorged must be realistic and relevant to the securities 
violation for which liability has been found, it likewise follows an offset in the latter 
instance must be realistic and relevant.  For deterrence to mean anything, it must 
not be starved by unrealistic and irrelevant reductions in disgorgement.  
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur in 1971, the courts have been explicating a doctrine 
of disgorgement in the context of SEC enforcement actions, a doctrine that has 
emerged sui generis.  Thus, by the time Congress codified the remedy of 
disgorgement in the securities laws,189 it could only have intended to adopt that 
unique equitable remedy that had been developed and relied upon for the preceding 
nineteen years.190 
Nothing in the legislative history suggests Congress intended to appropriate 
the common law doctrine of disgorgement as applied in cases between two private 
litigants.191  Significantly, in other fields of regulation where Congress has chosen 
to act, it has made clear the damages contemplated by the provisions passed were in 
fact a codification of those remedies and principles that have guided courts at 
common law.  On this issue, we are once more confronted with the erroneous 
rationale of the court in Thomas James Associates.192 
Thomas James Associates looms as the paradigmatic example of a court 
abusing its discretionary power in the face of substantial and significant 
countervailing precedent.  Because the case itself has become authority upon which 
                                                            
188 L.A. Trust Deed Mortg. Exch. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 285 F.2d 162, 168 (9th Cir. 1960) 
(citations omitted) (This quote was directly aimed at defining what constitutes a security but was 
indirectly aimed at keeping equitable enforcement of the securities laws in line with congressional 
intent). 
189 SERPSRA, supra note 5. 
190 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). 
191 See supra Part III.B. 
192 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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defendants have been able to dodge disgorging millions of dollars, each fracture in 
the court’s philosophical facade must be revealed.  
B. Critique of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thomas James 
Associates, Inc. 
As the foregoing sections have definitively demonstrated, the philosophy of 
common law equity under the securities laws has been legislatively altered.  
Consequently, all those ancient notions of fairness and equitable relief, justly relied 
upon by our federal trial courts and their magistrates, have been replaced—or ought 
to be replaced—with the doctrine of regulatory equity.  Understandably, the inertia 
of common law equity is great, providing a defense, however weak, to judges 
presiding over cases brought by the SEC.  Nevertheless, giving in to such inertia is 
an abdication of those duties pressed upon Article III courts to apply the laws as our 
legislature has constitutionally promulgated.  
In no other case is this abdication so apparent as in Thomas James 
Associates.193  There, by enumerating nine reasons to offset the SEC’s reasonable 
estimation of disgorgement, the Commission’s most powerful deterrence 
mechanism received death by a thousand cuts.194  Admittedly, the enumeration 
would likely be a fair and just quantification under our most ancient and common 
standards of equity.  However, under Congress’s regulatory equity regime, 
traditional cardinal considerations become subordinate to the weighty public policy 
of eradicating fraud in the securities industry.  The nine offsetting factors were: (1) 
commissions; (2) telephone charges; (3) underwriting expenses; (4) a proportionate 
share of overhead; (5) injunctions connected with the suit; (6) resulting harm to 
defendant’s reputation; (7) whether the defendant provides employment for a large 
number of individuals in a number of states; (8) prior to the litigation at bar, 
whether the defendant had enjoyed a relatively clean record with both the SEC and 
the industry’s self-regulating bodies; and (9) whether defendants fill a niche in the 
capital markets as an entity willing to underwrite highly speculative, but credible, 
companies.195  The following sections will address each of the rationales that the 
court asserted supported these factors and explain why the court’s reasoning was 
nothing other than erroneous. 
1. Background 
Thomas James Associates arose out of alleged securities law violations 
perpetrated in connection with four initial public offerings (IPOs) conducted by the 
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194 Id. 
195 Id. at 92–93. 
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defendants during 1989.196  The defendants operated as the underwriter for the 
offering.197  For purposes of the disgorgement hearing, the defendants accepted as 
true all allegations in the Commission’s complaint.198  Accordingly, the SEC 
brought suit because the defendants had:  
[P]articipated in a scheme to manipulate the market for [the four IPOs] 
.†.†. . [T]he scheme was effectuated by means of dominating and 
controlling the supply, the demand, and the price of [the offerings 
(known as market making)] to permit [the defendants] to charge 
excessive markups in the initial aftermarket and thereby [mulct] an 
illegal profit.199 
What is more, the purchasers of securities sold by the defendants were in 
reality not receiving the total number of shares they were paying for.200  Because 
the defendants had acceded to the allegations in the complaint, the court was only 
left with making findings and resolving those issues associated with the 
Commission’s request for disgorgement.201  In the end, the court granted a fifty 
percent offset to the SEC’s disgorgement calculation, taking in to consideration all 
those business costs associated with effecting the market manipulation of the IPOs 
in question.202  The court explained, “markups are a function of the way a securities 
firm does business, and[,] thus[,] have corresponding costs and expenses related to 
them.”203 
2. Critique of Rationales 
a. Reliance on the Trademark Regime 
 
In Thomas James Associates, the court decided to rest its flawed reasoning on 
a 1941 case explicating the 1905 Trademark Act.204  The case was Aladdin 
Manufacturing Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America.205  Without plunging into the 
substance of Aladdin and the Trademark Act of 1905, significant and sufficiently 
distinctive characteristics of the case already cast into doubt any  reliance upon its 
                                                            
196 Id. at 89. 
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198 Id. at 89 n.1. 
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200 Id. at 90–91. 
201 Id. at 91. 
202 Id. at 92. 
203 Id. at 95. 
204 Id. at 94. 
205 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941). 
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holdings in an SEC enforcement action.  First, the litigation was between two 
private litigants.206  This is important because “the [equitable] standard to be 
applied [changes] when the [C]ommission appears [before the court] as the 
statutory guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the 
securities laws.”207  Second, the case obviously has nothing to do with regulating 
the securities industry, an industry whose complexity and inherent opacity are 
irresistible sirens to the unscrupulous.  Finally, there is no comparable sovereign 
extension of the federal government charged with protecting the general public 
from the inimical act of trademark infringement.  The Supreme Court has been 
clear, the remedial scheme of the securities laws was intended to be broader and 
less technical than at common law, and to account for those public policy concerns 
of promoting the highest degree of ethics and professionalism in the investment 
industry.208  Therefore, it does not follow our trademark jurisprudence bears any 
relevance to an SEC enforcement action. 
Clearly, the Trademark Act codified the common law understanding of 
damages and equitable relief.  According to Aladdin Manufacturing, the damages 
contemplated by the Trademark Act, authorizing the mark’s rightful owner to 
recover damages in addition to profits to be accounted for by the infringer, are the 
same as might be recovered in an action at law from any tortfeasor.209  Yet, as we 
have already seen, the remedy of disgorgement contemplated by the securities laws, 
unlike the equitable relief contemplated by the trademark provisions, is not the 
common law notion of disgorgement.210 
Despite this plainly erroneous reliance on the jurisprudence of the trademark 
bar, the court averred offsetting to be entirely appropriate because it was 
permissible under the regulatory regime Congress had established for trademark 
protection.211  
“Even where Congress has expressly provided a disgorgement remedy in a 
statutory context, as in the area of trademark infringement, it has provided that a 
violator is entitled to set off all proven costs or deductions against the profits 
accruing from his violation.”212 
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207 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 215 n.23 (E.D. Mich. 
1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Financial Corp., 
890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989), and Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 734 F. 
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208 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87 n.13 
(1963). 
209 116 F.2d 708, 716 (7th Cir. 1941). 
210 See supra Part II. 
211 See generally Aladdin Mfg. Co., 116 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1941). 
212 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc. 738 F. Supp. 88, 94–95 (W.D.N.Y. 
1990). 
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However, just because Congress saw fit to expressly provide for offsetting 
under one regime, it does not necessarily follow it intended to under an entirely 
separate and distinct regulatory framework.  
Although at the time this case was decided Congress had not provided 
comparable guidance on disgorgement,213 there seemed to be no precedent for 
offsetting anything more than brokerage fees.214  Additionally, there was a clear 
expression by the courts adopting a broader, less technical principle of regulatory 
equity, thereby completely rejecting the argument Congress sought to codify the 
common law principles of equity in the securities laws.215 
Moreover, Congress is said to act fully aware of the antecedent legal 
frameworks when passing new legislation.216  Consequently, if Congress wanted the 
securities laws to be applied in the same manner, it could have put the offsetting 
language from the Trademark statute in the securities laws.  Consider the following 
section from the trademark statutes: 
(a) Profits; damages and costs; attorney fees that: 
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in 
the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section .†.†. 1125(a) 
or (d) [of this title], or a willful violation under section .†.†. 1125(c) [of 
this title], shall have been established in any civil action arising under 
this [chapter], the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of 
sections .†.†. 1111 and 1114 [of this title], and subject to the principles 
of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained 
by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.  The court shall assess 
such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its 
direction.  In assessing profits[,] the plaintiff shall be required to prove 
defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or 
deduction claimed.  In assessing damages[,] the court may enter 
judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum 
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times 
such amount.  If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery 
based on profits is either inadequate or excessive[,] the court may in its 
                                                            
213 See SERPSRA, supra note 5. 
214 But see supra Part II.A.1. 
215 See supra Part III.B. 
216 As the Ninth Circuit has said: 
 
We conclude, therefore, as the Supreme Court has stated with respect to other 
regulatory statutes, that the Congress must be taken to have acted cognizant of the 
historic power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory 
purposes.  As the Supreme Court long ago recognized, there is inherent in the 
courts of equity a jurisdiction to give effect to the policy of the legislature. 
 
L.A. Trust Deed Mortg. Exch. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 285 F.2d 162, 182 (9th Cir. 1960). 
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discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, 
according to the circumstances of the case.  Such sum in either of the 
above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.  
The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party.217 
Nevertheless, the fully cognizant Congress chose not to provide a liable 
defendant with the ability to reduce a disgorgement order in an SEC enforcement 
action as it did in the Trademark Act.218 
Now that disgorgement has been codified, and not in a way as 15 U.S.C. § 
1117—which takes into consideration deductions from gross proceeds—the SEC is 
due deference to the regulatory form of disgorgement always intended by Congress.  
Absent an express desire not to codify the understanding of regulatory equity as laid 
out by this article, the intent of Congress in 1990 was the same intent of Congress 
when originally passing the securities laws.219  Thus, the line of cases that form the 
doctrine of regulatory equity was not unchanged, and the unique form of 
disgorgement available to the SEC remains valid.  In this way, relying upon a 1941 
case interpreting a statute passed almost two decades before the first securities act 
was anachronistic and misguided at best.  
b. Reliance on the Doctrine of Restitution 
 
i. Equitable Posture 
 
The court in Thomas James Associates clearly saw itself as the preeminent 
arbiter of equity.  Consider the following quote: 
I find that it is appropriate to offset these gross profits from the four 
IPOs with certain business expenses attributable thereto by [the 
defendant].  These expenses include, for example, commissions, 
telephone charges, underwriting expenses[,] and a proportionate share 
of overhead.†.†. . I reduce [the defendant’s] gross revenues from the 
four IPOs by 50%, [] to reflect a fair setoff for necessary business 
                                                            
217 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (LexisNexis 2014) (emphasis added). 
218 See Securities Act §§ 8A(e) & 20(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(e), 77t(f) (LexisNexis 2014); Exchange 
Act §§ 20A(b)(2), 21(d)(4)–(5), B(e), C(e), F(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1(b)(2), 78u(d)(4)–(5), 78u-2(e), 
78u-3(e), 78u-6(a)(4) (2014); Investment Company Act §§ 9(e) & (f)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9(e), (f)(5) 
(2014); Advisors Act §§ 203(j), (k)(5), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(j), (k)(5). 
219 The author believes Congress’ intent in 1990 when it codified disgorgement into the federal 
securities laws must have been the same when the federal securities laws were originally passed because 
the codification did not limit the doctrine of disgorgement as it had developed through case law prior to 
1990. 
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expenses.220 
Further exemplifying its presumed equitable discretion, the court considered 
factors such as: (a) “the firm provide[d] employment for [three hundred] individuals 
in a number of states;” and (b) the firm’s “relatively clean record with both the SEC 
and the industry’s self-regulating bodies.”221 
Nevertheless, the court’s holding in Thomas James Associates was proven to 
be a doctrinal anomaly just eight years later in Kenton Capital.  There, the district 
court in the D.C. Circuit finally got to answer the offsetting question it reserved in 
footnote 16 in its Bilzerian opinion.222  Addressing the objection to the 
Commission’s reasonable estimation of unjust enrichment to be disgorged, the D.C. 
district court said, “In response, [d]efendants argue that disgorgement is improper 
because these funds are no longer in Kenton’s possession, having been paid to third 
parties for ‘legitimate business expenses.’”223  Supporting their objection, the 
defendants relied “primarily on [Thomas James Associates] in which the court held 
that a court ordering disgorgement ‘may consider as an offset the expenses incurred 
by defendant in garnering such unjust enrichment.’”224  Significantly, the court 
agreed with the Commission Thomas James Associates does not reflect the 
overwhelming weight of authority holding securities law violators may not offset 
their disgorgement liability with business expenses.225  The defendants in Kenton 
Capital attempted unsuccessfully to distinguish such cases.  The SEC had provided 
ample evidence all the funds collected by the defendants were obtained 
fraudulently, “and [d]efendants may not escape disgorgement by asserting that 
expenses associated with this fraud were legitimate.”226 
In sum, there could not have been a clearer rejection of the erroneous 
rationale employed by the court in Thomas James Associates.  Taken together, 
Bilzerian and Kenton Capital stand for the proposition allowing offsets for business 
expenses associated with a securities law violator’s fraud is illegitimate.  Therefore, 
reliance upon Thomas James Associates to support reducing a reasonably calculated 
disgorgement order is beyond the pale of equitable discretion. 
                                                            
220 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
221 Id. at 93. 
222 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116, 122 n.16 (D.D.C. 1993). 
223 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1998). 
224 Id. at 16. 
225 Id.; see also Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (D.N.J. 
1996) (distinguishing Thomas James Associates as limited to disgorgement of “excessive profits”); Sec. 
and Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equities Co., 775 F. Supp. 211, 214–15 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (rejecting 
deductions from the disgorgement amount for overhead, commissions, and other expenses and criticizing 
Thomas James Associates for equating disgorgement with restitution); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. 
Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating the “manner in which [defendant] chose to 
spend his misappropriations is irrelevant as to his objection to disgorge.”).  
226 Kenton Capital, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
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ii. Rebutting the Application of Restitution 
 
The rationale in Thomas James fails primarily because the court attempted to 
equate disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context with the common law 
doctrine of restitution. 
In determining the proper amount of restitution, a court may consider as an 
offset the sums that a defendant paid to effect a fraudulent transaction.227 
However, this grossly ignores the settled notion disgorgement is not 
restitution228 and common law principles of equity, as applied to disputes arising 
between two private litigants, are not appropriate in federal regulatory 
enforcement.229 
Furthermore, Ellsworth’s article even points out by implication disgorgement 
is not restitution,230 which we have already seen stems from the fundamental 
difference between private securities litigation and SEC actions.231  There are 
reasons why the philosophy behind disgorgement in private securities litigations 
differs from that of SEC actions.  Significantly for this critique, Ellsworth 
acknowledged as much without demur.232  At common law, disgorgement in a 
private securities litigation action requires all elements of restitution to be pled.233  
Therefore, private parties must show they were injured.234  However, the 
Commission’s congressional mandate is both specific and general deterrence.  As 
an enforcer of the securities laws, the SEC is authorized to seek disgorgement, even 
when no identifiable injured party exists.235  Therefore, the common law elements 
of restitution need not be pled in the SEC enforcement context.236 
In no other case brought by the Commission prior to Thomas James 
Associates had a court recognized the above nine identified considerations when 
ordering disgorgement.  While such factors would plainly be relevant in a case 
between private litigants, they are inapposite because disgorgement in the SEC 
enforcement context is not restitution.  To this point, the overwhelming weight of 
binding and persuasive primary authority has consistently held the purpose of 
                                                            
227 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); 
see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION ch. 7 (1937); see also John D. Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities 
Fraud Actions Brought by the SEC, DUKE L.J. 641, 651 (1977). 
228 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Teo, 746 F.3d 90, 104–07 (3d Cir. 2014). 
229 See supra Part III.D. 
230 Ellsworth, supra note 228, at 650–52 
231 See supra Part III.D. 





2014 DERANGED DISGORGEMENT 181 
 
disgorgement is not restitution but simply to deprive the defendant of his or her ill-
gotten gain.237 
The following year in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Great Lakes 
Equity,238 the court took notice of the philosophical split between the Second and 
Sixth Circuits by recognizing Thomas James Associates as a relevant, though not 
binding, choice of authority by the defendant.239  In footnote 22, the court subtly 
rejected the offsetting of business expenses granted in Thomas James Associates 
and went on in its opinion to explain the equitable standards to be applied in SEC 
enforcement actions are fundamentally different from traditional common law 
principles of equity and restitution.240  More specifically, the district court in Great 
Lakes Equity stated: 
Finally, with regard to Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thomas 
James, the district court clearly equated disgorgement with restitution, 
738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y.1990).  The Sixth Circuit in Blavin 
rejected the defendant’s argument that disgorgement was a type of 
restitution that should be based on investor losses.  Instead, the Sixth 
Circuit stated that once the Commission has established that a defendant 
has violated the securities laws, the Court possesses the equitable power 
to grant disgorgement of a sum of money equal to all other “illegal 
payments received.” 760 F.2d at 713.241 
At bottom, the court in Thomas James Associates clearly abused its discretion 
by ignoring over a half a century of doctrinal development.  The notion 
disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context is not restitution is well settled and 
beyond reproach.  The abusively broad holding of Thomas James Associates 
continues to plague the SEC and confound the judges who decide its cases.242 
 
iii. “Real Dollar Restitution” 
 
“Real dollar” restitution may be the common law remedy available to private 
                                                            
237 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes Capital Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1080, 1084–85 (D.N.J. 1996) 
(citing Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating disgorgement is 
not restitution)) aff’d 124 F.3d 449 (3d Cir. 1997); Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 
(6th Cir. 1985). 
238 775 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Mich. 1991), aff’d 12 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1993). 
239 Id. at 214–15. 
240 Both First City Financial Corp., 890 F.2d at 1232–33 n. 24, and Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman 
Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.), recognize that the standard to be 
applied differs when the commission appears, as here, as . . . the statutory guardian charged with 
safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws . . . .  
Id. at n.22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241 Great Lakes Equity Co., 775 F. Supp. at 215 n.22. 
242 See supra Part VII. 
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litigants, but it is not the purpose for which the securities laws were enacted when 
the SEC is bringing suit.  Nevertheless, the court in Thomas James Associates said, 
because the evidence supporting the SEC’s disgorgement calculation had only been 
testimonial, “it provides no basis for real dollar restitution.”243  This conclusion by 
the court was plainly erroneous for three glaring reasons.  First, the learned judge 
misconstrued the evidentiary standard and burden placed upon the SEC.  Second, in 
light of how statutory purpose shapes equitable remedies, the common law principle 
of real dollar restitution had been long since abandoned.  Finally, disgorgement in 
SEC enforcement actions is clearly not restitution. 
To the first point: In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. British 
American Commodity Options Corp.,244 the federal court was specifically 
explicating the doctrine of disgorgement within the context of regulatory 
enforcement.245  In doing so, it considered the role disgorgement played in both 
CFTC and SEC enforcement actions, drawing no distinctions between the two.246  
There, the court held a dollar for dollar accounting was not required.247  Secondly, 
as Part III of this article clearly evinces, the doctrine of regulatory equity embodied 
in the securities laws is not a codification of the common law principles that guide 
courts adjudicating disputes between private parties.  And, finally, if not 
exasperatingly, disgorgement is not restitution.248  Thus, the court in Thomas James 
Associates was misguided when it used the real dollar restitution standard. 
 
iv. The Ellsworth Article 
 
Believing it was rightly applying the common law doctrine of restitution, the 
court in Thomas James Associates granted an offset on the basis there were 
sufficient deleterious effects of the ensuing action that would likely be within the 
court’s discretion to acknowledge.249  The court deemed injunctions, bad publicity, 
and harmed reputation to be such factors:250 
I also find it appropriate to reduce the amount of disgorgement to be 
paid by the defendants in view of the other terms and conditions for 
resolving this case which the SEC has demanded and to which the 
                                                            
243 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 92 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
244 788 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter CFTC]. 
245 Id. at 93–94. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 93. 
248 See supra Part II.B.3. 
249 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 94 (W.D.N.Y. 
1990). 
250 CFTC, 788 F.2d at 92.  This article does not pass on the propriety of taking into consideration 
these factors in a private suit between private litigants. 
2014 DERANGED DISGORGEMENT 183 
 
defendants have acceded.  Defendants TJA, Villa, and Thomas are 
permanently enjoined from future violations of the federal securities 
laws; any violation in the future will expose the defendants not only to 
the renewed scrutiny of the SEC but also to potential charges of 
contempt.†.†. . .  The defendants’ professional and personal reputations 
have [also] been called into question by this litigation .†.†. .251 
Realizing it had no primary support for its position, the court had to rely, not 
only on the irrelevant trademark law analogy, but on an antiquated and out of 
province non-binding secondary source.252  Ellsworth’s article suggested 
injunctions, bad publicity, and harmed reputation were legitimate ameliorative 
factors to be considered when issuing a disgorgement order.253  However, reliance 
on the Ellsworth article is immediately suspect because it was written a mere six 
years following the seminal case in our disgorgement jurisprudence, a time of 
doctrinal confusion.254  And more specifically, it is suspect because the doctrinal 
confusion surrounding the Commission’s new remedy centered primarily on 
whether disgorgement was restitution, which we know now it is not.255 
Accordingly, this non-binding secondary source was already antiquated and 
out of province by the time the court relied upon it in Thomas James Associates.  
Furthermore, another thirteen years of doctrinal development after its publication 
had provided the courts with ample opportunity to address disgorgement in a 
variety of securities violations.  During that period, the D.C. Circuit and the 
Supreme Court, both exceedingly persuasive primary authorities, made it clear the 
remedial purposes of the securities laws did not seek to codify common law notions 
of equity and restitution.256  Further still, in the mid 1980s, cases expressly held 
disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context was not restitution.257  Therefore, 
where bad facts make bad law, so too do bad sources. 
c. Reliance on the Defendant’s Industry Niche 
 
Interestingly, the court reasoned offsetting disgorgement was further 
supported because the securities firm filled “a niche in the capital markets as a 
                                                            
251 Id. 
252 In fact, the court never cited to any primary authority where the SEC’s disgorgement request was 
offset by business expenses and factors such as the nine enumerated at the beginning of Part VII. 
253 Id. at 661 (suggesting effect of adverse publicity is a cost to be charged off against 
disgorgement). 
254 See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). 
255 See supra Part II.B.3. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. 
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company willing to underwrite highly speculative, but credible, companies.”258  
Though it goes without saying the micro and nano-cap markets259 are crucial to a 
healthy capital market, it is precisely in this niche where smart and ethical securities 
professionals are needed the most.  Yet, it is also where the greatest opportunity for 
unchecked fraud resides.  Despite speaking with respect to the need for civil 
penalties, Congress identified the growing exposure to fraud in this niche market 
identified by the court in Thomas James Associates: 
The Committee believes that additional authority is needed to respond 
to increasing violations in such areas as the fraudulent sales techniques 
and price manipulation of the penny stock market, violations of 
beneficial ownership disclosure rules including “parking,” and trading 
violations such as those that occurred during the market break of 
1987.260 
Significantly, it was precisely those trading violations that occurred in 
Thomas James Associates that the Congress aimed its legislative efforts at 
deterring.  Thus, instead of the niche market being a reason to limit the deterrent 
effect of the securities laws, it should be a reason to give them life. 
On the other hand, we see in Securities and Exchange Commission v. JT 
Wallenbrock & Assoc.,261 a Court lending credence to Thomas James Associates 
based upon the rationale the customers would have faced regular markup expenses 
if the fraudulent markups were not perpetrated.262  However, this analysis ignores 
the fact the SEC does not stand in the shoes of victimized participants of the 
investment industry.263  For support, JT Wallenbrock suspiciously cited to Litton 
Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Bros., a case adjudicating a dispute as between two 
private litigants.264  Whenever a court adjudicating an SEC enforcement action cites 
to Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. to support an offset for either flavor of 
business expenses,265 as we have seen many opinions do, we would have evidence 
the Courts are applying equitable principles as applied to private litigants and not 
those regulatory equitable principles ordered by the Supreme Court to be applied 
                                                            
258 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 93 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
259 Micro and nano-caps markets are those in which market capitalization are usually less than three 
hundred million dollars and fifty million dollars respectively.  These entities are often associated with the 
penny stock market. 
260 H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 19.  Note SERPSRA 
went into effect in October of 1990, and the Thomas James Associates opinion came down in May of the 
same year. 
261 See 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). 
262 Id. at 1114−15. 
263 See supra Part III.D. 
264 440 F.3d at 1114−15. 
265 JT Wallenbrock does, but Thomas Jones Associates does not. 
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when the SEC brings suit pursuant to its law enforcement authority.  Consequently, 
the limited acceptance of Thomas James Associates by JT Wallenbrock is neither 
persuasive nor binding.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Capital Gains Research explained 
Congress intended to establish a broad remedial scheme to deter securities 
violations, thereby promoting the highest standards of ethics and professionalism.266  
Best practices and principles were intended by Congress said the Supreme Court,267 
and it is in those very instances of start-up companies where we need ethical and 
competent professionals.  But, it is in this very segment of the industry where fraud 
metastasizes so readily.  Unlike what Thomas James Associates suggests, the 
necessity of those willing to underwrite high risk public offerings are no more 
deserving of a break from the deterrent jostles of the securities laws than the 
bedrock financial institutions of Wall Street. 
d. Reliance Upon Egregiousness 
 
Earlier, we touched upon the relevance of egregiousness when determining 
disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context.  There, it was argued to be 
inapposite.  Nevertheless, Thomas James Associates incorporated egregiousness 
into its reasoning when holding offsets to be appropriate.  
On this point, Thomas James Associates conceded gross profits equaled 
proceeds and appropriate in Securities and Exchange Commission v. R.J. Allen & 
Associates, Inc.268: 
In holding that, when exercising its equity jurisdiction to order 
disgorgement of unjust enrichment, a court may consider as an offset 
the expenses incurred by defendant in garnering such unjust enrichment.  
I acknowledge that securities law violations may exist in which 
disgorgement is properly ordered in the amount of the total gross 
profits.269 
The above passage suggests the calculation of ill-gotten gain is effected by 
the facts and circumstances of a defendant’s fraud, such as egregiousness and the 
degree of scienter.  While these factors may influence the imposition of civil 
penalties,270 they do not reach into the pocket of the defendant to take back exactly 
                                                            
266 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963). 
267 Id. 
268 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974). 
269 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
270 See e.g., R.J. Allen & Assocs. Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (ordering disgorgement of 
all proceeds received in a fraudulent scheme aimed at least in part at former prisoners of the Vietnam 
War who had accumulated, and lost, substantial sums of back pay).  Egregiousness and scienter do play 
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what was taken.271  Thus, the recognition of the gross proceeds theory of 
disgorgement by the court combined with the settled notion disgorgement is not 
restitution and ought to be enough to invalidate the holdings of Thomas James 
Associates and its progeny. 
C. Critique of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Video Without 
Boundaries 
Unfortunately, the holding in Thomas James Associates is gaining traction.  
In Video Without Boundaries, the Southern District of Florida chose to ignore 
decades of doctrinal development by endorsing the most flagrant and misguided 
decision in the disgorgement line of cases.  By adopting Thomas James Associates, 
which relied upon a trademark infringement case between two private litigants, the 
Southern District of Florida inexplicably ignored relevant Eleventh Circuit case 
law.  If the Southern District truly felt the question of offsetting was best explicated 
by cases between private litigants in lieu of persuasive anti-offsetting precedent, the 
court did not have to look to a recondite case from the Western District of New 
York.  Rather, there was persuasive guidance locally dealing with securities fraud.  
Consider Pidcock v. Sunnyland America.272  Reviewing the principle 
action,273 the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, advising, contrary to 
allowing deductions, “it is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit 
of even wind-falls than to let the fraudulent party keep them.”274  On remand in 
Estate of Pidcock v. Sunnyland America,275 the district court dutifully denied 
deductions of any expenses or costs.  This established precedent in the Eleventh 
Circuit, combined with the foregoing, makes the Southern District’s subsequent 
adoption of Thomas James Associates even more erroneous in Video Without 
Boundaries, and likely willful.  
                                                            
an integral role when determining civil penalties under the securities laws in the insider trading context.  
See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Chapnick, 1994 WL 113040 at 4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 1994); Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n v. Brethan, 1992 WL 420867 at 25 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
271 See supra Part IV.A (commenting egregiousness is only a factor to properly consider when 
determining civil penalties). 
272 Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 682 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Ga. 1987) rev’d, 854 F.2d 443 (11th Cir. 
1988). 
273 Id. 
274 Pidcock v. Sunnyland America, 854 F.2d 443, 446 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 
344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965)) (emphasis added).  The Eleventh Circuit held the district court erred 
in not considering the disgorgement remedy under Janigan and its progeny.  Id. at 448.  
275 See 726 F. Supp. 1322 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (holding there were no circumstances to warrant crediting 
defrauding purchasers with any special efforts that would limit disgorgement). 
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D. Conclusion 
It should now be clear the rationale of Thomas James Associates was grossly 
misguided, if not deliberately obtuse.  Thankfully, the courts are not left without 
well-reasoned primary authority to guide them when ordering disgorgement in the 
SEC enforcement context.  Specifically, Great lakes Equity cited to Litton 
Industries, and Securities and Exchange Commission v. First City Financial Corp., 
when it followed the Sixth Circuit’s position from Blavin, in the SEC enforcement 
context, disgorgement is not restitution.276  Therefore, gross pecuniary benefits may 
not be offset even if they could be at common law. 
In sum, Great Lakes Equity should be the law because: (1) its reasoning is 
grounded upon binding and greatly persuasive precedent; (2) Thomas James 
Associates cites no precedent in the SEC enforcement context to support its 
position; rather, it expressly ignores precedent; (3) precedent has established by 
1989 common law principles of equity within the enforcement context do not serve 
the remedial purposes of the securities laws, and a new regulatory equity had by 
then coalesced; (4) Thomas James Associates chose to recognize but ignore R.J. 
Allen for reasons inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the securities laws; and 
(5) Great Lakes Equity’s opinion was based on binding and persuasive primary 
sources of law, whereas Thomas James Associates was based on mere secondary 
sources and a misguided analogy to trademark law.  Thus, Great Lakes Equity’s 
explicit rejection of Thomas James Associates is exceedingly credible.  
VIII. SUMMATION 
As we have seen, the chaotic application of disgorgement in SEC 
enforcement actions across the circuits is pernicious.  Since the enactment of the 
securities laws, the courts have struggled with applying the remedial intentions of 
Congress.  Circuits have recognized how other circuits differ considerably in their 
notions of equity within the context of SEC enforcement.  One court has observed, 
unless the Supreme Court specifically addresses offsets to disgorgement, it would 
not even consider another circuit’s contrary application as persuasive.277  This 
article has tried to emphasize the sui generis nature of disgorgement when it is a 
remedy sought by the federal regulators of the investment industry.  Thirty years 
                                                            
276 See 775 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Mich. 1991); 734 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 890 F.2d 1215 
(D.C. Cir. 1989); 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 
69 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (damning the decision in Thomas James Associates); Sec. and Exch. 
Comm’n v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975). 
277 “The case law cited by the defendants is neither binding precedent, nor persuasive.  First the 
defendants’ cases are not precedent because none of them are from the Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court.”  
Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. Supp. at 215 n.22. 
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after the SEC’s first organic authority was promulgated,278 the Supreme Court held 
the equitable relief the courts had within their discretion to grant, served a broader 
remedial purpose than traditional common law remedies of equity and restitution.279  
Building upon this supreme declaration, the D.C. and Southern District of New 
York280 have both stated the equitable standard to be applied changes when the 
Commission appears before them as the statutory guardian charged with 
safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws.281  In application, 
however, the circuits have failed to exchange their traditional common law robes 
for the new fashion of equity approved by the Supreme Court and necessary to 
serve the remedial purposes of the securities laws.  Since Texas Gulf Sulfur in 1971, 
the doctrine of disgorgement has been a tidal pool fueled by the ebb and flow of 
inter-jurisdiction confusion282 and intra-jurisdiction uncertainty.283 
Yet, securities fraud is one of the most atomic of the species, whose 
prevention enjoins a unique equitable approach: 
[The law has] come to regard fraud .†.†.as primarily a tort, and hedged 
about with stringent requirements, the chief of which was a strong 
moral, or rather immoral element, while equity regarded it, as it had all 
along regarded it, as a conveniently comprehensive word for the 
expression of a lapse from the high standard of conscientiousness that it 
exacted from any party occupying a certain contractual or fiduciary 
relation towards another party.284 
But: 
Fraud is infinite, and were a [c]ourt of [e]quity once to lay down rules, 
                                                            
278 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2012). 
279 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) 
(stating Congress did not codify the common law of fraud and equity in the securities laws); see also id. 
at 194 (citing Ridgely v. Keene, 119 N.Y.S. 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909) (illustrating the continuing 
doctrinal development of fraud in the context of equity)). 
280 The D.C. Circuit and the Southern District of New York should be considered relatively 
persuasive authorities because of the frequency at which cases involving SEC enforcement come before 
them. 
281 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. First City Financial Corp., Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1232–33 n.24 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989); Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y.1990) (citing Mgmt Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d at 808); see also Great Lakes Equity, 775 F. 
Supp. at 211;  Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Penn Cent. Co., 450 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
282 This inter-jurisdiction confusion is notably evident between the Sixth and Second Circuit. 
283 The Eleventh Circuit disallowing offsetting in Securities and Exchange Commission v. R.J. Allen 
& Associates, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974), and then adopting offsetting in Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Video Without Boundaries, Inc., 2010 WL 5790684 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010), 
through Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thomas James Associates, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88 
(W.D.N.Y. 1990).  See also Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. United Monetary Servs., Inc., 1990 WL 91812 
(S.D. Fla. May 19, 1990). 
284 HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 643 (8th ed. 1962). 
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how far they would go, and no farther, in extending their relief against 
it, or to define strictly the species or evidence of it, the jurisdiction 
would be cramped[] and perpetually eluded by new schemes which the 
fertility of man’s invention would contrive.285 
Today, the fertility of man’s invention remains bountiful.  Given the financial 
turmoil of 2008 and its persistence through 2011, much of the investing public has 
come to regard investment professionals as the pirates of Wall Street.  
Consequently, there are many who would not balk at sewing them up in their 
hammocks with a thirty-six-pound shot at their heads and heels.286  Drunk on greed, 
securities fraudsters such as Mr. Madoff and Mr. Standford typify those men “born 
with a pen behind the ear and an inkstand in place of a heart.”287  Thus, courts must 
be obliged to re-center their jurisprudence in SEC enforcement actions, squaring it 
with the deterrent regulatory regime originally intended by Congress.  
In 1914, Louis Brandeis penned one of the most abiding lines in the precept 
of the federal securities laws.  He wrote, “Publicity is justly commended as a 
remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”288  It is, therefore, 
incumbent upon the securities bar to shine light on the pernicious practice of 
offsetting in the SEC enforcement context.  A disgorgement order, reasonably 
quantified, demands nothing less than the giving up of gross pecuniary gain. 
Notwithstanding the doctrinal amorphousness, this article has attempted to 
distill disgorgement in the SEC enforcement context down to its constituent parts, 
identifying what it is and what it is not.  Disgorgement is not restitution.  Therefore, 
the adoption of the profit theory and offsetting principle in section 51 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution does not apply.  When congress codified the 
remedy of disgorgement in the securities laws, it defined unjust enrichment as being 
equal to a defendant’s gross pecuniary gain.  Capital Gains Research and its 
progeny are clear.  The equitable scheme intended by Congress is broader than 
traditional equitable principles of restitution and other common law concepts of 
equity as between competing private interests.  And, now that almost every known 
modern SEC enforcement action brought in federal court imposes prejudgment 
interest, the courthouse doors are definitively open to the benefit principle.  Thus, 
the judiciary’s continued acceptance of offsetting in SEC enforcement actions is 
                                                            
285 See Letter of Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kames (June 30, 1759), printed in JOSEPH PARKES, 
HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 508 (1828) quoted in EDMUND HENRY TURNER SNELL, SNELL’S 
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 496 (25th ed. 1960); see also Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 193 n. 
41. 
286 ALEXANDER DUMAS, THE COUNT OF MONTE CRISTO (1888). 
287 Id. 
288 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Chapter V: What Publicity Can Do, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, available at 
http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196 (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
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illegitimate, willful, and unfaithful to the remedial scheme intended by Congress. 
Finally, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the investing public needs, 
as much now as it did in 1933, meaningful regulation of the investment industry.  
Uniformity and consistency in the application of disgorgement in SEC enforcement 
actions is the sine qua non of meaningful deterrence, which is after all one of the 
most fundamental purposes of the securities laws.  If the judiciary persists along its 
present course, then the goals of regulating the securities markets, specific and 
general deterrence, will remain a chimera.  Certainly, the manipulative purposes, 
which gave rise to securities regulation, would yield but only to the extent judicial 
enforcement was simply the cost of satisfying boundless cupidity. 
 
